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This dissertation focuses on the leadership figures of Julius Caesar and Henry V 
through a double perspective, historical and Shakespearean, trying to evaluate if they 
convey any lessons for the leaders of today and tomorrow. The combination of 
historical and literary analysis expresses the two main purposes of the dissertation: 
exploring the strategic challenges Caesar and Henry had to face when in command and 
how they acted upon them, as well as a reflection on the relevance of Shakespeare’s 
work to the study of leadership. In regards to the first objective, it is argued that despite 
being inadequate to build a contemporary leadership framework from the lives of these 
men, they fit into a modern model of leadership which encompasses six characteristics - 
influence, purpose, direction, motivation, accomplishment and improvement. Moreover, 
their profiles also convey lessons on how to think strategically and how to adapt to 
changing circumstances. In regards to the second aim, it is claimed that Shakespeare’s 
work should not be taken as a structured portrait of individual leadership skills, but 
instead as a subtle analysis of the dilemmas inherent to any position of power. 
Ultimately, the inclusion of both historical and literary approaches can broaden the 
scope of leadership studies, adding a human dimension to this field of research. 
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The subject of this dissertation is leadership and strategy. Its structure revolves 
around the case studies of Julius Caesar and Henry V not only from the historical point 
of view, but above all from the perspective of William Shakespeare, who chose them as 
central characters in two of his most celebrated plays. The aim of this work is twofold: 
first, to understand the main challenges great men face when leading the destiny of a 
nation and what strategies they used to overcome them; and second, to reflect upon the 
relevance of Shakespeare to the study of leadership.  
Several voices claim that we are facing a worldwide crisis of leadership today. 
According to the World Economic Forum, 86% of the respondents to the Survey on the 
Global Agenda 2014 (Shahid, 2014) agree that there is an evident lack of leadership in 
their nations, making it one of the top 10 trends to follow in 2015. Far from being a 
“western world” issue, data from the same report show that such perception is global, 
ranging from Europe to Asia, passing through the Middle East, though with greater pre-
eminence in North America and Sub-Saharan Africa, where only 8% of the respondents 
are satisfied with worldwide leadership. But the problem is not new. If we look back to 
the history of the 20th century, the one name that springs to mind as a paradigm of 
leadership is Winston Churchill
1
. Since then, hardly another figure has emerged and 
reached such a level of consensus regarding leadership skills and strategic vision. It is 
perhaps true that the democratic regimes make it harder for statesmen to leave their 
mark in history, such is the brevity of their mandates. Nevertheless, Churchill was a 
member of a democratic government and, as such, bound to the will of the British 
people – who chose not re-elect him prime-minister in 1945 just after the Allied victory 
                         
1
 Naturally there are other important leaders we could mention such as De Gaulle, Eisenhower, Roosevelt 
or even Hitler and Stalin, and those just in relation to the Second World War. But in our view is that none 
has achieved the status of Winston Churchill. 
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of the Second World War, but put him back in charge in 1951 – and still he managed to 
carve his path into our history books. So our question follows the motto left by the 
Portuguese historian Filipe Ribeiro de Menezes in his recent piece for the 50th 
anniversary of the British leader: “where are the heirs of Churchill? Where are the 
visionary, refined, brave and generous men and women capable of dragging us out of a 
crisis that is undermining the confidence in the destinies of our continent and our 
common civilization?” (Menezes, 2015). 
In a lecture delivered in 2009 by William Deresiewicz at the United States 
Military Academy of West Point entitled “Solitude and Leadership” (Deresiewicz, 
2010), this problem is tackled in a very concise way. The premise of Deresiewicz’ 
speech is that solitude is a crucial necessity for true leadership, and the problem he 
points to is the existence of a leadership crisis in America due to fact that education has 
long been creating technocrats instead of leaders. What is valued nowadays, he argues, 
is conformity instead of creativity, specificity instead of strategic vision and getting 
things done instead of understanding why things are done in the first place. This does 
not mean that these characteristics are bad or undesirable, they are indeed crucial to 
fulfil goals or ask questions, they simply are worthless if we want someone who sets 
those goals and asks those questions, someone who can think and argue on his own. 
There is an evident lack of thinkers in our society, and the ability to “think things 
through for himself” and follow a line of action in accordance - or in other words 
developing a strategy - is, above all other things, exactly what makes a leader. 
 
Therefore, our argument is that, in this context of a global leadership crisis, there 
is a necessity of revisiting leadership models provided by history and literature alike in 
order to understand the strategic mindset of those men and women, who managed to 
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overcome situations of extreme distress and succeeded in guiding their nations to 
prosperity. First of all, to understand if there are any lessons we can take from these 
models and second, to evaluate the extent to which these lessons can be applied 
nowadays. With this in mind, our choice of case-studies rested on Julius Caesar and 
Henry V. But why these two? What do Caesar and Henry V have in common? 
At a first glance it may seem odd to put both in the same stage. The first was a 
Roman citizen who, through shrewd ambition, bravery and opportunism, rose to 
Rome’s political elite eventually becoming dictator, forever changing the history of the 
Roman Republic. The second was an English monarch, born almost 1500 years after 
Caesar who although never meant to be king, sat in the throne, restored his kingdom’s 
order and honour and launched a successful invasion of France. From this superficial 
outline, apart from commanding the destinies of their nations, it seems quite a stretch to 
find common ground to analyze their paths in parallel. Nevertheless, the main reason 
why we believe it matters to look into the life of these two characters is exactly to 
understand how these men steered their people and overcame the inevitable obstacles 
that positions of leadership always entail. 
Furthermore, there is at least one more thing that Caesar and Henry V share: 
they were both subjects of William Shakespeare’s plays. But posing the same question 
we did before, why did he choose these two characters in particular? More than the 
dramatic value of the characters used for the sake of amusing the audiences, more than 
the historical significance of depicting the lives of such remarkable men, what 
Shakespeare offers is a portrait of leadership and a take on the subtleties of power and 
authority. Based partly in historical sources and partly in sheer creativity, both plays are 
an important complement to the historical figures in the sense that they delve into their 
psyche, allowing us to put ourselves in their places and understand how they reflected, 
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analyzed and reacted to specific challenging circumstances. In few words, Shakespeare 
depicts the way leaders think and the core dilemmas every leadership position entails. 
 
With the premise established it matters now to look to the approach we propose 
to follow. First and foremost, it is important to acknowledge that the topic has 
undeniable literary contours which on the one hand, cannot be bypassed because of their 
importance to our analysis, and on the other hand must not be over-emphasized, for it 
would be a deviation both from the aim of the dissertation and from the MA’s fields of 
study. Thus, this dissertation will attempt to intertwine both historical and 
Shakespearean perspectives, but always within the specific framework of leadership and 
strategy.  
In regards to structure and method, our dissertation will be built around four 
main pillars: Leadership, Shakespeare, Julius Caesar and Henry V. These cornerstones 
will be translated into four main chapters: «What is leadership? », «Julius Caesar», 
«Henry V» and «Shakespeare’s Leaders – Julius Caesar vs. Henry V ». While the first 
three will attempt to present its topics in a separate way, the fourth will consist of a 
comparative analysis of the two Shakespearean figures, making a contrast between their 
strategic challenges as well as the similarities and differences of their Shakespearean 
portraits. 
The first chapter – « What is leadership? » – will be divided into three sections 
aiming to clarify the operating concepts underlying our analysis. Firstly, we will define 
the concept of leadership and draw an overview of the evolution of its theorization. 
Secondly we will go through the concept of strategy, its development over time and its 
connexion with leadership. Finally, we will analyse the concept of grand strategy 
underlining its link with individual leadership. This chapter has an obvious conceptual 
5 
 
nature and its main aim is to introduce the framework of leadership which will help in 
our analysis of Caesar and Henry V.  
The second chapter – «Julius Caesar» – will follow a threefold structure, 
covering the main aspects of the life of the historical figure and the underlying strategic 
challenge. The first section, «Family Context», will describe Caesar’s upbringing and 
initial career, trying to answer the question of who was Julius Caesar when he reached 
power. Furthermore, «Political Context» will address his main life accomplishments 
and most notable episodes: the Gallic and Civil Wars and the end of the Republic. In the 
third part we will identify Caesar’s main strategic challenge – the Republic-Empire 
transition and the tension between personal leadership and the strategy of Rome as a 
nation and political entity – and how it was overcome. 
The third chapter – «Henry V» – will have the same structure as the previous 
one, with three sections with similar titles. It will begin with a section covering Henry’s 
education and youth, trying to understand how the to-be leader emerged. The second 
section will analyze the first years of King Henry V’s reign, focusing on his capacity as 
an administrator as well as the reasons which led to the French invasion.  Moreover, we 
will also identify his strategic challenge as the invasion of France and the consolidation 
of England, analysing the major episodes of this period. 
The fourth chapter – «Shakespeare’s Leaders – Julius Caesar vs. Henry V» – 
will look at the figures of Caesar and Henry as depicted by Shakespeare. Besides a 
separate analysis of each character in the first two sections, we will also establish a 
comparative framework between the two leaders, intertwining history and fiction. 
Firstly, Caesar and Henry V’s main divergences will be pointed out, making reference 
to the contrast between contexts, internal enemy and external enemy, as well as 
ambition versus duty. Secondly, we will also examine the common traits, namely the 
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fact that they were both unexpected leaders and the importance of military prowess and 
strategy in their careers.  
Finally, in the conclusion of this dissertation we will draw on the lessons of 
leadership that can be taken from the preceding study of the figures of Caesar and 
Henry, trying to understand to what extent are they applicable to our current times. 
Shakespeare’s relevance to the field of leadership studies will also be discussed. 
 
In a final note, it seems clear that few of the leaders who came and went in the 
last decades left such an indelible mark as Julius Caesar or Henry V. Surely the 
circumstances are beyond compare – current social, political, economical and military 
realities are far away from those in Ancient Rome or Medieval England – but are their 
challenges so distinct and the nature of people so different that their lessons are 
worthless for the leaders of today and tomorrow? And is Shakespeare’s insight on the 
complexities of human nature completely irrelevant to the study of leadership 
processes? We do not believe so, reason why we propose to analyze leadership and 
strategy in the work of William Shakespeare with a focus on Julius Caesar and Henry V 











Chapter 1 - What is Leadership? 
 






The words of James Burns portray a staggering reality: although our lives are 
ruled by the decisions of elected statesmen, who in turn have their lives and decisions 
incessantly scrutinized by the electorate, we still fail to understand what leadership 
positions entail and by which ideals we should guide when analyzing such phenomena. 
It is surely true that democratic regimes have brought some constraints to leadership, 
namely through public accountability and electoral mechanisms, but they surely have 
not made obsolete the role of leader (Heywood, 2013: 300). 
With strategy a similar situation occurs. As ubiquitous as it is, there seems to be 
neither agreement on a standard definition nor on the limits of its realm of application. 
As such, its meaning “has become diluted through promiscuous and often inappropriate 
use” (Freeman, 2013: 11) and nowadays, much of the publications on strategy concern 
its economic and business variant and not the original concept. 
As two of the central notions for the understanding of our study, the purpose of 
this first chapter is mainly the definition of leadership and strategy. We will analyze the 
central bibliography on those topics and come up with two basic definitions, which we 
will then use to define a third concept which supersedes the realm of strategy: grand 
strategy. 
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The theoretical notions of leadership are countless. As O’Neil (2008) put it “as 
many definitions of leadership exist as do authors who have studied the concept”. 
Indeed the interest on the subject of power and authority, leaders and followers, rulers 
and ruled, can be traced back to Thucydides, Herodotus, Plato and even beyond.  
Nevertheless, comprehensive theorization on leadership emerged mainly on the second 
half of the 20th century, aiming not only to understand the behaviour of leaders but also 
to find ways to improve the performance of organizations and its members. 
Traditional ideas during the 19th century focused on traits and attributes of 
character as the basic source of leadership, meaning that a leader was someone naturally 
predisposed to such position. However, after the Second World War and with the 
inclusion of analytics, studies tended to focus more on behavioural patterns and 
observable characteristics of leaders (O’Neil, 2008), further evolving into studies of 
leader-follower relationship and the importance of context in those relations. Although 
not being considered specifically a theory of leadership, one of the most important 
contributes was given by Max Weber (1970) through his studies on the legitimization of 
power, where he made the distinction of the three types of authority: traditional, 
legal/rational and charismatic. The absorption of these conceptions (especially the later 
two) and the evolution of leadership studies have culminated with the emergence of a 
division between two basic types of leaders: transactional and transformational. On the 
one hand, transactional approaches see leadership almost as a pragmatic and managerial 
task, where the leader-follower relationship focuses on “exchanging one thing for 
another” (Burns, 2012: 14), e.g. votes for higher salaries, in a democratic election. On 
the other hand, the transformational leader - a concept associated with James 
MacGregor Burns’ magnum opus “Leadership” - is someone with vision, inspiration, 
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persuasive and motivational characteristics, who aims to engage and fulfil not only his 
personal aims, but also the goals of his followers. From these two views, Burns (2012: 
640) develops his conception of leadership, one which is held by many as standard: 
 
Leadership is the reciprocal process of mobilizing, by persons with certain 
motives and values, various economic, political and other resources, in a context 
of competition and conflict, in order to realize goals independently or mutually 
held by both leaders and followers. 
 
Although this definition is indispensable to understand most of the theoretical 
approaches to modern leadership, the nature of our case-studies – undemocratic and 
military leaders of the Classical and Medieval world – requires a more informal and 
practical concept, encompassing both the behavioural pattern of the leader, including his 
relationship with the followers, and his personal qualities, as suggested by Heywood 
(2013: 300). Thus, we will follow the concept provided by the US Army (Department of 
the Army, 2006: 1-2): 
 
Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, 
and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the 
organization. 
  
This definition conveys the core aspects of the first dimension of leadership we 
mentioned – behavioural pattern – which are: influence, purpose, direction, motivation, 
accomplishment and improvement. To these we add the dimension of personal 
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character, as the main qualities we find indispensable in leading figures. These two 
dimensions will be the guidelines for our analysis of Julius Caesar and Henry V.  
 
2. Strategy 
“Everyone needs a strategy” states Sir Lawrence Freedman (2013: 9) in the 
preface of his colossal anthology “Strategy”, emphasizing the pervasiveness of the 
concept and its application to innumerable fields of study and action. In fact, Freedman 
(2013: 9) goes on saying that “there is no human activity so lowly, banal, or intimate 
that it can reasonably be deprived of a strategy” which makes its realm and scope 
almost infinite. Moreover, as we will see, the use of the term has developed over time. 
Thus, the task of coming up with a definition broad enough to encompass its extension, 
yet concise enough to establish its limits without losing significance, has proven 
particularly challenging.  
The etymological origins of the word strategy come from the Greek strategía or 
strategiké, which corresponded to “the set of skills of the commander in chief” 
(Comprido, 1984) or general (stratégos), which in turn “is the one who practices 
strategy” (Heuser, 2010: 4). The concept had extensive use in the classical world and its 
meaning continued to evolve until Byzantium, where by the sixth century it was already 
distinguished from taktiké (tactics) - a “science which enables one to organize and 
maneuver a body of armed men in an orderly manner” (Heuser, 2010: 4) and, as such, 
subordinated to strategy. However, the decline of both Greek and Roman civilizations 
was followed by a parallel decline of the use of the term. Until the French Revolution 
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not much was written about strategy in the West
3
, but instead the focus was on military 
affairs and the «art of war», as in Machiavelli (2003[1521]). 
 
With perspectives framed primarily by theoretical reflections and concerned by 
the definition of strategy either as an art or a science, early 18th century thought was 
completely shaken by Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz’ considerations “On War”, 
which were largely influenced by his observation (and actual participation) of the 
Napoleonic Wars and hence were applicable in practice. Clausewitzean formulation was 
quite simplified and straightforward seeing strategy as “the use of engagements for the 
object of the war” (Clausewitz, 2007[1832]: II.1). Nevertheless his definition of war as 
“an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” (Clausewitz, 2007[1832]: I.2) was 
the notion which endured throughout time, giving room to the association the concepts 
of strategy and war, with the former seen as the pursuit of the aim of the later (Heuser, 
2010: 6). Clausewitz notion was built upon by other thinkers such as Helmuth von 
Moltke and Raoul Castex, but it was still overly attached to military affairs, lacking the 
political dimension which is imperative in strategic thinking. 
Although the maxim “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means” 
was established by Clausewitz (2007[1832]: I.24), the development of the linkage 
between war, strategy and politics is made by Baron de Jomini (2008[1838]: 46), whose 
categorization of wars and fields of strategy is paramount in taking “political aims into 
account as chief variable determining the character of any Strategy” (Heuser, 2010: 14). 
With the outcome the World Wars and the increasing blurring of strategy and policy, 
Basil Liddell Hart advanced with a paraphrasing of the Clausewitzean formulation 
which is understood by some as the modern definition of strategy: “the art of 
                         
3
 It is important to note that our analysis emphasizes Western contributions to the field of strategy. 
Naturally, eastern contributions such as Sun Tzu and his Art of War, generally considered the father of 
eastern military strategy, should not be ignored. 
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distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy” (Liddell Hart, 
2011[1954]: 388). 
Nonetheless, Liddell Hart’s interpretation seems too broad and still exceedingly 
concerned with military affairs. In line with Beatrice Heuser (2010: 9-28) and Sir 
Lawrence Freedman (2013: 11-20), we believe that a definition of strategy must 
encompass four dimensions. Firstly, its connection with politics, deriving from the 
axiom that “war is an instrument of politics”. Secondly, its presentation as a “clash of 
wills” in the sense that it is a process which implies the existence of a counterpart, thus 
requiring adaptability, flexibility and balance of power. Thirdly, strategy entails the 
interaction of “multiple and interdependent variables”, hence demanding a careful 
harmony between ends and means. Finally, the fact that it must be present both in 
wartime and peacetime making it “an inherent element of statecraft at all times”
4
. 
Therefore, the definition we chose as guideline to the analysis of our case-studies is the 




[Strategy is] about maintaining a balance between ends, ways and means; about 
identifying objectives; and about the resources and methods available to for 
meeting such objectives. It is the art of creating power. 
 
3. Grand Strategy 
In the aftermath of World War II and with the start of the Cold War, the 
definition of strategy was once and for all interwoven with politics. In an attempt to 
shed some light in an increasingly blurred notion the term «grand strategy» emerged, 
                         
4
 Heuser (2010: 26) in reference to Edward Mead Earle’s famous volume The Makers of Moder Strategy. 
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with particular emphasis in Britain (Heuser, 2010: 27). Edward Luttwak (2001) defined 
it as: 
 
A confluence of the military interactions that flow up and down level by level, 
forming strategy’s “vertical” dimension, with the varied external relations 
among states forming strategy’s “horizontal” dimension. 
 
The term is almost self-explanatory. Adding a sort of higher and broader scope 
to strategy, grand strategy entails state policy, diplomacy and foreign affairs, acting as 
rudder to leaders attempting to “chart a course for their nations” (Murray, 2011: 1). But 
pursuing the interests of a nation implies making difficult choices. As a result, 
according to Williamson Murray (2011) grand strategy involves four traits. Firstly, the 
capacity to adjust to different realities (economic, military, social, etc.). Secondly, 
balancing risks according to national priorities. Thirdly, adapting national focus to the 
ever-changing foreign environment. Finally, it needs vision, long-term goals and an 
ability to act “beyond the demands of the present”. 
Despite being an idiosyncratic process, surrounded by uncertainty, and so broad 
that it is hard to unveil its limits, grand strategy is important to our study for it 
comprises the overall course of nations, being largely influenced by individual 
leadership. Henceforth, we will try to understand to what extent did Caesar and Henry 
V pursue a grand strategy for their respective nations. 
 
We have underlined in the introduction that the main focus of this dissertation is 
leadership. Although our aim is not to develop a comprehensive analysis of the 
leaderships of Julius Caesar and Henry V through the prism of leadership theory, we 
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believe that opening with a chapter that introduces the major ideas in this field helps to 
have an overview of the characteristics we will be looking for in these leaders. 
Furthermore, due to the fact that our case-studies are deeply connected with military 
command, we decided to introduce the concept of strategy even though it will not be 
explored in depth throughout our study. What we feel is that it is very difficult to 
dissociate the concepts of leadership and strategy, particularly when studying men who 
relied so much in armed forces and war enterprises as a source of power. In addition, the 
introduction of the concept of grand strategy matters because Caesar and Henry had the 
destinies of two great nations on their shoulders and as Williamson Murray (2011: 21) 
argued “perhaps the most important factor in the development and execution of 
successful grand strategy has been leadership at the top”. Finally, the interlinking of this 
three notions will help us in the historical analysis of each of our leaders through the 
introduction of the concept of strategic challenge as the defining episode in their 
leadership, enabling to scrutinize their actions in perspective in order to understand how 
and why they behaved in such demanding circumstances.   
Thus, the conceptual nature of this chapter rather than establishing a theoretical 
baseline that we would confirm or refute, matters to us as a background to the profiles 
of Caesar and Henry. In addition, from the first definition we derive a framework of 
leadership - consisting of the characteristics of influence, purpose, direction, motivation, 








Chapter 2 – Julius Caesar 
 
«I could be well moved if I were as you. 
If I could pray to move, prayers would move me. 
But I am constant as the Northern Star, 
Of whose true fixed and resting quality 
There is no fellow in the firmament. 
The skies are painted with unnumbered sparks; 
They are all fire, and every one doth shine; 
But there’s but one in all doth hold his place.» 
 
Julius Caesar in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar 
III.1.58-65 
 
Caesar’s boastful speech moments before being stabbed to death by his fellows 
in Shakespeare’s play, may seem terribly ironic at first. Bragging about being “constant 
as the Northern Star” and “unassailable”, he is quickly reminded of his mortality by his 
former companions, in what is undoubtedly history’s most famous assassination. 
Nevertheless, the rest of the play seems to prove Caesar was right, with his eternal 
“presence” and influence constantly assailing his murderers and dictating the 
denouement of the play. 
Julius Caesar lived fifty five years, but in that period of time he rose to power, 
conquered Gaul and started a Civil War that would forever change the destiny of Rome. 
Outstanding politician, ruthless general, skilled administrator and brilliant author, 
Caesar remains as probably the most famous character in ancient history. 
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In this chapter, we will trace a portrait of Caesar in order to understand his 
prominence as a leader and strategist. Starting with his background and rise to power, 
we will then examine the conquest of Gaul and the Civil War. Finally, our last but 
central section will identify and analyze the strategic challenge underlying Caesar’s life. 
 
1. Family Context 
Gaius Julius Caesar was born on the 13
th
 of July of the year 100 BC. He was a 
descendant of the Julii, an ancient patrician family that despite claiming a divine link to 
Aeneas and therefore to the goddess Venus had only produced one consul in the 
previous century (Goldsworthy, 2010: 229). The Julian family “had recently emerged 
from a long period of obscurity” (Caesar, 1967: 13) thanks to the marriage between 
Caesar’s aunt Julia and Caius Marius, who managed to be elected five times as consul 
after saving Rome from the Cimbri and Teutones in the turn of the century. This figure 
not only had a major impact on the Julii but “had a decisive influence on Caesar’s youth 
and subsequent career”
5
, for example in his later facet of popularis
6
, so important 
throughout his entire political career.  
There are few accounts of young Caesar’s education and youth, but everything 
points out to a classical education of a Roman nobleman, handled almost exclusively by 
the family. It is known that his mother Aurelia had a strong and enduring influence not 
only in Caesar’s education, but also throughout his career (Goldsworthy, 2013: 56). As 
his fellow nobles he was educated to cherish the qualities of dignitas (more than dignity 
it entailed the importance and responsibility of the man), pietas (respect for the Gods 
and the family) and virtus (the military qualities of confidence, courage and virtue), as 
                         
5
 This is claimed by Christian Meier (1996:55) but other authors such as Goldsworthy (2013: 62) doubt 
that Caesar learned a great deal from his uncle Marius. 
6
 The populares were the men who embraced popular causes with the intent of gaining the support of the 
people. Caius Marius had been a popularis at times, mainly due to his status of homo novus, the first of 
his family to ascend to political prominence. 
17 
 
well as   the feeling of belonging to the Roman Republic, which granted them a superior 
and special status coupled with the duty of living according to Roman society’s patterns 
(Goldsworthy, 2013: 57-61). 
The first display of Caesar’s character occurred around 81 BC following a 
dispute with Sulla
7
, who wanted to break his marriage with Cornelia, daughter of Cinna, 
an old enemy of the regime. In a very bold move, young Caesar refused the divorce 
order being the only one amongst several to defy the authority of Sulla, which showed 
great courage but forced him to flee. He could only return after his mother interceded, 
with Sulla granting him a pardon and allowing him to start his political career. 
This experience led to Caesar’s departure to Asia (80 BC-78 BC) and to his first 
military achievements, being rewarded with the corona civica, one of Rome’s highest 
civic awards. He then returned home for a brief period of time, when he first displayed 
his oratory skills as an advocate in the courts of Rome. Soon after, in 75 BC, he decided 
to go abroad, allegedly to study oratory with a Rhodian master. During his travels there 
was a specific episode, described by both Suetonius (1972: 11, IV) and Plutarch (1959: 
II), which gives an important hint on Caesar’s character and capacity to turn a bad 
situation into a favourable one. In brief
8
, during one of his trips Caesar was captured by 
pirates who demanded twenty talents for his ransom, amount that ashamed him and led 
to his suggestion that he would pay fifty talents for his own freedom. During the 
captivity he befriended the pirates with his fluency, but kept always a superior and 
provocative attitude, telling them that after they freed him he would have them 
crucified. After the release, what the pirates took as a joke actually happened: with 
undeniable persistence, Caesar pursued his captors, crucified them and recovered the 
ransom. Although we cannot be sure to what extent is this story true, Caesar’s later 
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acclaimed virtues of ruthlessness, persuasion, perseverance and even in a twisted way 
his clemency – he ordered the cutting of their throats before the crucification – were 
already unfolding. 
We can say that Caesar’s political career effectively started around 74 BC with 
his nomination for pontifex and soon after for military tribune in 73 or 72 BC. From the 
date he turned 30 (70 BC) he became eligible to run for office as a quaestor, “the lowest 
rung of the Roman career ladder” (Meier, 1996: 134), to which he managed to be 
elected and then sent to the province of Hispania Ulterior as aid to the governor. After 
his return to Rome, Caesar kept on rising in the Roman political ranks, first as curator of 
the Via Appia and in 65 BC as aedile – office dedicated to the internal organisation of 
the city. In these two offices he seized the opportunities to strengthen both his position 
as a popularis, granting the support of the masses, and his political career, by spending 
huge amounts of money in gladiatorial games and infrastructures for the people of 
Rome. To sum up this first political decade Adrian Goldsworthy (2010: 230) says that 
“In many aspects Caesar’s initial career was conventional, but there was some 
extravagance in his behaviour that seems to have arisen public controversy and grant 
him many enemies”. 
Caesar’s political escalation proceeded, and by the year of 63 BC, in a scandal of 
high stakes (his political career was at risk) and unprecedented bribery, he managed to 
be elected pontifex maximus, the highest rank among the priests of Rome, usually held 
by much older and consensual individuals. This episode is another proof of Caesar’s 
enormous ambition and will to carve his own path at any cost: “It seems insanely 
daring, and one wonders whether it was not an act of desperation; at least it was an act 
of wilfulness” (Meier, 1996: 161). This same year he was also elected praetor, and one 
can suppose that from this moment onwards the young, restless and warm-blooded 
19 
 
Caesar started to turn into a more mature but no less wilful and ambitious man, 
probably focused on the potential office of consul. As a result of this nomination, he 
was sent to the province of Hispania Ulterior as a governor, for the period of 61 to 60 
BC, where he competently reformed the administration and achieved important victories 
against local tribes. It was around this period that he allegedly declared, over a fight 
between two men for the administration of small village, «I for my part would rather be 
the first man here than the second man in Rome» - reinforcing the idea of his ambitious 
character (Goldsworthy, 2013: 198). 
After his successful governorship, the Senate decided to give Caesar a triumph. 
Hearing about this, Caesar hastily returned to Rome, where he declined the honour for it 
would prevent him to run for consul the following year. It was then during the year of 
59 BC, after ensuring the support of two major political figures in Rome –– the city’s 
richest man Crassus and the acclaimed general Pompey - that “Julius Caesar skilfully 
explored the major weaknesses of the Republic’s constitutional system and the tensions 
between other potential candidates” (César, 2004: 53) and secured his election for 
Consulship. The brilliant move of uniting such old and powerful enemies like Pompey 
and Crassus by shrewd persuasion granted Caesar the leverage he needed to face 
Marcus Bibulus, the second consul backed by the conservative Senate. The First 
Triumvirate was thus born. Once again we are faced with a fantastic sense of 
opportunity, strategic thinking and extraordinary wilfulness that so far had made Caesar 
victorious in every stage. “For the present (...) the only certainty was that Caesar had 
found his own path, the path he had always sought” (Meier, 1996: 203) and that path 





2. Political Context 
During his term as consul, Caesar was assigned the military command of 
Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria – to which was later added the province of Transalpine Gaul 
– along with an army of four legions for the period of five years. This command was a 
huge opportunity for Caesar for three main reasons: first, because of the proximity of 
Cisalpine Gaul
9
 to Rome; second, as a Roman legions’ recruiting and training ground, it 
allowed him to raise an army, crucial for holding on to his power in Rome without 
depending so heavily on the other Triumvirs; finally, due to the fact that Transalpine 
Gaul was a very unstable zone that might provide the chance for war, synonym of fame 
and fortune for Caesar. 
Arriving in Gaul by 58 BC, Caesar was unable by law to engage in war or 
conquest on his own enterprise - military intervention was only allowed if it was in 
Rome’s best interest. However, in a stroke of luck, Caesar’s chance arose with the 
Helvetii’s migration (Caesar, 1967: II.1) through Roman territory, a barbarian tribe that 
had inflicted a major defeat to Rome in 107 BC, which Caesar promptly used as 
justification to launch his offensive. After seizing this opportunity by defeating the 
Helvetians, Caesar was then prepared to launch full-scale war against the rest of Gaul. 
The next enemy he defeated was Ariovistus and the Sequani (Caesar, 1967: II.2) who 
had attacked the Aedui, tribe which had an old allegiance with Rome. In less than a year 
Caesar had successfully led two victorious campaigns that “would have satisfied any 
Roman governor, since they provided immense fame and plunder” (Goldsworthy, 2010: 
242). Nevertheless, during the following years he proceeded to north-eastern Gaul to 
fight and defeat the Belgae (Caesar, 1967: II.3-4), the Veneti (Caesar, 1967: III.1) and 
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every other tribe that crossed his path. In 56 BC he also managed to extend his 
command in Gaul for five more years. 
Between the years of 55 and 50 BC Caesar led his armies through several 
victories in Germanic territory (Caesar, 1967: IV), two incursions in Britain
10
 and the 
crushing of numerous tribal revolts, from which the one led by Vercingetorix (Caesar, 
1967: VIII) was the most notable. As a result, by 50 BC virtually “the whole of Gaul 
was now conquered” (Caesar, 1967: 234). 
In the nine years that lasted the Roman campaigns in Gaul, the borders of the 
empire increased immensely, a whole new culture was incorporated in Roman domains 
and the Gallic people greatly influenced by Rome’s tradition. However, the process of 
conquest was restless, unscrupulous and brutal. The number of Gauls killed varies 
according to the sources, but Plutarch (1959) states it reached one million, without 
mentioning the captured and enslaved. But putting aside the monstrosities of war, which 
are sadly common to every conflict, what we witnessed in this period of nine years was 
the dawn of a military genius and the affirmation of a cold and pragmatic strategist. As 
told by Goldsworthy (2013: 457): “His conquest of Gaul was neither a long desired 
object nor an ambition in other sense than seizing all the possibilities of reaching glory.  
It was chance and opportunity that made him focus his attention in Gaul”. It is also 
probable that, one way or another, the Gallic domains would eventually fall under 
Rome’s dominance, for the city produced numerous capable generals throughout its 
history. However, more than probability or luck, Rome’s decisive factor was Caesar’s 
judgment. The ambition that led him to the supreme command of Gaul turned gradually 
into an ability of thoroughly “exploiting every opportunity of conflict and conquest” 
(Goldsworthy, 2013: 458) that resulted in the swift, ruthless and tireless process of 
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dominance of this province and its fierce inhabitants. It is certain that Caesar had his 
frailties and for that he suffered the consequences of bad decisions (like the 
incontrollable lust for fame and glory which led him to invade Britain), but his capacity 
of quickly recovering from setbacks and, with an aggressive self-confidence, turning 
defeats into major victories made him not only incredibly rich and famous but also the 
leader of a powerful and devoted army. 
In the words of Newell (2009: 18), “war is the crucible of leadership” and Gaius 
Julius Caesar’s conquest of Gaul is a mirror image of that fact. But as his leadership 
grew and consolidated, so did his wealth and power, at such a rate that the Senate, 
which already had a suspicion on his character and intentions, started to worry. Caesar’s 
next step would be taken towards Rome as his wish was to return home as an acclaimed 
victor, thus securing an election for Consulship once again. Nonetheless, Rome and its 
prodigal son – Pompey – had a say on that matter. 
With the death of Julia – Caesar’s daughter married to Pompey – in 54 BC and 
Crassus in 53 BC, the ties between the two remaining members of the Triumvirate 
suffered a severe blow and began deteriorating. Furthermore, while Caesar was fighting 
Vercingetorix, several mutinies in Rome led to the nomination of Pompey as sole 
Consul, granting him immense power to crush the rebellions and restore the city’s order. 
In addition, he also got an extension of his command in Hispania. The following years 
of 51 and 50 BC saw an increasing pressure by the Senate for Caesar’s lay down of the 
command of Gaul and consequent return to Rome. It appears that many failed attempts 
of finding a middle ground between the demands of both Caesar and the Senate took 
place, with propositions from both sides. However, as Lucan put it in his Pharsalia, 
“Caesar could no longer endure a superior, nor Pompey an equal”
11
 and all the 
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negotiations failed. The climax of this process is reached on the 10
th
 of January of 49 
BC: along with 300 horsemen and one of his legions, Caesar arrives at the Rubicon, a 
stream in the north of Italy. But much more than a small river dividing Cisalpine Gaul 
from Italy, the Rubicon marked the point of no return both for Caesar’s career and the 
future of Rome. It represented the divide between loyalty and treason, shame and glory 
and eventually, life and death. So, armed with the conviction that we was defending the 
rights of the tribunes and his own dignity, Caesar crossed the Rubicon triggering the 
start of the Civil War – «alea iacta est», the die had been cast
12
.  
In the first three months of 49 BC, Caesar’s troops swept through northern Italy 
with few struggles mainly because “the cause against Caesar had little popular support 
and his army was neither making pillage nor having attitudes that might give reason to 
hostility” (Goldsworthy, 2013: 501). It was during this period that Caesar puts to work 
one of his propaganda tactics that became famous: his “policy of clemency”
13
. After 
taking the city of Corfinium, 50 senators and equites were captured and surrendered to 
him. But instead of taking their lives, Caesar made a speech where he stated his reasons 
for war and favours he had done to them in the past and set them free (Goldsworthy, 
2013: 503). This strategy had a double purpose: first, to gain the favour of the people 
and second, to humiliate his enemies. Meanwhile, Pompey had fled to Greece where he 
hoped to raise an army and prepare for the ultimate battle with Caesar. However, after 
reaching Rome and securing Italy, Caesar turned his attention to Spain, where Pompey 
had his finest troops, with the purpose of neutralizing an obvious threat before 
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following the later to Macedonia.  Swiftly and with almost no bloodshed (always 
repeating the policy of clemency), Hispania was dominated by August of 47 BC
14
. 
The final clash between the two commanders happened only one year later, 
August of 48 BC, starting with an important defeat for Caesar after crossing the Adriatic 
(Meier, 1996: 388-397). It was finally in the battle of Pharsalus that Pompey was 
defeated – fleeing to Egypt where eventually he was murdered – and the outcome of the 
Civil War decided, though the fight was far from over. After crossing the 
Mediterranean, Caesar became involved in Egypt’s civil struggles, defeating Ptolemy 
and making Cleopatra not only queen but also his lover. In 47 he departed to Syria and 
defeated the enemy so quickly in the battle of Zela, that he pronounced the famous 
words “I came, I saw, I conquered” (Veni, vidi, vici). With increasing impatience he 
made an almost disastrous incursion in Africa by 46 BC, against the troops commanded 
by his old general Labienus, “but his talent for improvising and his refusal in 
questioning his own final success, combined with the quality of his officers (...), 
allowed Caesar’s army to survive its initial frailty until the arrival of reinforcements” 
(Goldsworthy, 2010: 289). 
For a brief period in between campaigns, he returned to Rome being named both 
dictator for ten years and Consul for the fourth time. At long last, the conflict reached 
its finale in 45 BC with the defeat of the remnants of Pompey’s army, led by his son in 
Munda, Spain. With the Civil War finally over, he returned to Rome covered in glory 
and was named dictator for life, having the task of settling down Rome and maintaining 
peace between hands. 
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3. Strategic Challenge 
Shortly after his return to Rome, Julius Caesar was brutally assassinated on the 
ides of March of 44 BC by a group of conspirators led by his former companions Brutus 
and Cassius
15
. Ironically enough, he died at the feet of a statue of Pompey, his lifelong 
archenemy whom he had defeated not long ago. Caesar’s legacy, as we will discuss, is 
immense and incredibly far reaching. Nevertheless, his premature death prevented him 
to implement whatever strategy he may have had for Rome in the short-term, leaving 
room for the most disparate conjectures. Still, the last part of Caesar’s life, and as a 
consequence the bulk of his inheritance, is underpinned by the tension between personal 
motivations and the strategy of Rome as a political entity, which is intimately connected 
to the Republic’s decay and culminated in the Civil War. We believe that this process 
constitutes the central strategic challenge for Caesar and thus we analyze it in detail.    
The whole process of the Bellum Civile, with special emphasis on the crossing 
of the Rubicon, gives us proof of the magnitude of Caesar’s persona. The events that led 
to the eruption of the War and the reasoning behind the conflict can be easily resumed 
in one sentence: a single man’s quest for the defence of his honour, respect and 
reputation – his dignitas. Having always served exemplary his homeland – both in his 
consulship, passing important laws, and in his term in Gaul, immensely expanding 
Rome’s domains – and thus receiving three victories from the Senate, Caesar could not 
understand the aggressive attitude of its peers, who wanted to take him to trial and strip 
him of his glory and recognition. “The simple fact of having to defend himself was a 
severe blow to Caesar’s pride and auctoritas” (Goldsworthy, 2013: 479) because no 
other great man of Rome had had to endure such injury – the Senate “failed to see the 
absurdity of prosecuting a man who had done so much for Rome during the past nine 
                         
15
 According to Strauss (2015) and defying common belief, Decimus may be the key to the whole plot to 
kill Caesar. His recent work is the most thorough study of the causes and consequences of Caesar’s death. 
26 
 
years” (Meier, 1996: 360). Consequently, he felt trapped and all options at sight but one 
seemed pointless. That remaining option was war, and Caesar decided to follow that 
path fully conscious of the outcome of his actions.  
Julius Caesar knew that by leaving the Rubicon behind it would all come down 
to one ultimate issue: “Caesar or the republic” (Meier, 1996: 363). This is the reason 
that sets Caesar apart, not only from his younger self, but especially from the common 
mortal: being able to defy a whole system on the basis of defending his own dignitas 
and ignoring all the consequences. An alternative account of the Rubicon episode puts 
Caesar saying «Here I leave the basis of law, dishonoured as it is», quote that ultimately 
depicts the enormity of his deeds and his undeniable greatness. However, greatness in 
this sense must be understood as an ambivalent term (Meier, 1996: 362). On the one 
hand, the level of determination, resilience and courage to take on a challenge of this 
magnitude solely to defend his honour and prestige and, to certain extent, the rights of 
the tribunes and the people of Rome, is a gamble which only a great man would 
attempt. On the other hand, it is almost heinous to consider that one man would be 
capable of putting at risk the lives of thousands of Romans for a cause that lacked 
“nothing but a cause” (Meier, 1996: 5) and was fully centred on his figure. But perhaps 
before forming an opinion we should seek to understand how Caesar’s motivations were 
formed and to what extent were the circumstances decisive in his judgment. 
Around the second half of the II century BC the first signs of a crisis
16
 started to 
arise, with brief periods of social unrest and political instability disturbing a long cycle 
of prosperous and stable expansion of the Republic. Though subject to major 
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, the causes of this crisis can roughly be attributed to two 
major factors: external and internal struggles. The expansion of Roman domination was 
escalating quickly and henceforth war, which until then had been mainly a seasonal 
endeavour, became a permanent activity. Consequently, mobilization of citizens was 
constant, which necessarily brought major socioeconomic changes (Raquel, 2005: 29). 
The core of Rome’s economy was agriculture and consequently, the majority of men 
were farmers. Thus, the increasing necessity of a professional army
18
 had necessarily to 
bring about a structural change in the fabric of Roman society. Moreover, the rise of 
commercial activity due to the expansion of the Republic caused the enlarging of the 
equites class, who despite being economically powerful had very limited political 
influence. 
Naturally, social unrest kept escalating and the increasing cleavage between 
opposing factions in the Senate (the plebs and the aristocrats) paved the way to major 
internal struggles. One of the sparks was Tiberius Gracchus’ agrarian reforms, 
emphasized by his brother Gaius later on
19
, which pretended to increase the basis of 
landowners and limit state property. The equilibrium finally shattered around 91 BC 
with the burst of the Social War – a revolt of Rome’s Italian allies
20
 due to their claims 
for citizenship. Even after the defeat of the socii in the decade of 80 BC the situation did 
not stabilize, with the opposing political factions led by Marius and Sulla engaging in 
open war. The result of this conflict was the self-proclamation of Sulla as the first 
dictator in 82 BC, starting a reign of terror which would last until 79 BC. In the 
following years both internal and external conflicts kept raging, namely the slaves’ 
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revolt led by Spartacus and the struggles with King Mithridates (Holland, 2003: 161-
199) in the province of Asia, adding to an already fragile situation. By the time Caesar 
was ravaging Gaul, the Senate was struggling with obscure power games, corruption an 
endless disputes between factions (Raquel, 2005: 36). Furthermore, the fame, fortune 
and influence achieved by Caesar in his campaigns were causing the envy of many 
patrician senators, who started acting in order to strip him of his glory. 
According to Christian Meier’s thesis, Julius Caesar rose in the Roman society 
as an outsider, mainly as a product of the late republic’s increasing problems and 
contradictions
21
, which we already described, creating his own self-centred world and 
his own independent reality, where he found both validation for his actions as well as an 
escape to the obsolete institutions of Rome. Meier (1996: 11) says:  
 
His personal ambition had developed and consolidated itself in a powerful 
individual position, which was grounded in an admirable, if one-sided, ethos 
that embodied the old aristocratic ideal of achievement. (...) This goes some way 
to explaining Caesar’s readiness to embark upon a war that could affect all 
men.  
 
But this exceptional trait of character distinguishing Caesar from other great 
Romans of his time is only one side of his paradoxical persona. His personality 
embraces a contradiction in the sense that although being an “outsider” that defied the 
rule of the Senate, broke the boundaries of the society and forever changed the destiny 
of Rome, he was nothing more than a product of the same society and the times he lived 
in, which were, as we saw, dangerously unstable. 
                         
21
 In our opinion, the best analysis of the last years of the Republic, tracing back the origins of the crisis to 
the paradoxes in it foundations can be found in Holland (2003). The seminal work by Syme (1939) is also 




Julius Caesar was an exceptional character. We saw that in regards to military 
talent he had few peers, managing to bond with his men, serve as an example and 
develop a strategic intelligence out of the ordinary
22
. Above all he “had tactical coup 
d’oeil, that is to say, the ability to perceive the decisive point, even the need to intervene 
personally in the fight when his army was on the verge of defeat or when the moment 
had arrived to move in for the kill” (Fields, 2010: 14-15). In terms of leadership skills, 
Caesar clearly fulfilled the core aspects we outlined in the first chapter. He was a great 
influencer, with major persuasive skills, not only in the battlefield but also in the 
political arena. His sense of purpose was deeply connected with his ambition, but he 
always managed to point out a direction to his followers, who were at all times 
motivated to the point of risking their lives for Caesar. Finally, in regards to 
improvement, it would be very controversial to affirm that the transition from the 
Republic to the Empire brought benefits to everyone; though assuming that he should 
bear full responsibility for the process of overthrowing the Republican rule is also very 
questionable. Besides, by analyzing the measures he took and what he managed to 
accomplish with his victories, it is hard to say that he did not do it for the better sake of 
the majority.  
All in all, Gaius Julius Caesar “was an exceptionally talented individual, but he 
was also a product of his age” (Goldsworthy, 2013: 662), who more than challenging 
the law of man challenged the law of fate, showing that great man are responsible for 
carving their own destiny. 
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Chapter 3 – Henry V 
 
«From this day to the ending of the world, 
But we in it shall be remembered, 
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers; 
For he to-day that sheds his blood with me 
Shall be my brother; be he ne’ er so vile, 
This day shall gentle his condition: 
And gentlemen in England now a-bed 
Shall think themselves accursed they were not here, 
And hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks 
That fought with us upon Saint Crispin’s day .» 
 
King Henry V in Shakespeare’s Henry V 
IV.3.58-67 
 
Despite being a discourse imagined by Shakespeare, King Henry V’s Saint 
Crispin’s day speech, delivered on the brink of the battle of Agincourt, is an impressive 
piece of oratory aimed at rallying Englishmen to a battlefield where they were greatly 
outnumbered. Besides its primary purpose, the speech is the apex of the literary portrait 
of a man who seems to be the model of the perfect leader: brave, righteous, just, ruthless 
and charismatic. However, an attentive reading of Shakespeare reveals an apparent blur 
of Henry’s moral character, raising doubts about the true nature of power and 
leadership, which we will explore in due time. 
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Also known as Henry of Monmouth, Henry V had a short (1413-1422) but 
legendary reign. Breaking the tacit truce that marked the Hundred Years' War during the 
years prior to his coronation, Henry launched an offensive against the French which had 
its pinnacle in the famous battle of Agincourt, where he achieved an outstanding 
victory, regarded by many as one of the most important battles in British history.  
Following the structure of the previous chapter, we will trace a portrait of Henry 
V in order to understand his prominence as a leader and strategist. Starting with his 
background and rise to power, we will then examine the invasion of France and the 
consolidation of English power. The final and central section will identify and analyze 
the strategic challenge underlying Henry V’s life. 
 
1. Family Context 
Born in the Welsh castle of Monmouth in August or September of 1386 or 
1387
23
 – reason why he was known by Henry of Monmouth –, Henry was son of Henry 
of Bolingbroke, earl of Derby and Duke of Hereford, and Lady Mary de Bohun. 
Although not in the direct line of royal succession, he was grandson of the wealthy and 
prominent John of Gaunt
24
, founder of the second House of Lancaster and King Richard 
II’s eldest uncle and guardian
25
. 
Losing his mother at the age of seven and not seeing much of his father 
throughout his boyhood – Bolingbroke was campaigning and jousting in Eastern Europe 
and afterwards making a pilgrimage to Jerusalem – he received a regular nobleman’s 
medieval education, being tutored by his uncle Henry Beaufort, distinct clergyman and 
politician, later nominated Cardinal and Bishop of Winchester. He spent most of his 
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youth during the “Quiet Years” of King Richard II
26
, who grew very fond of him, 
favouring him several times (Hutchison, 1967: 18). After his father’s banishment in 
1398, young Henry was taken to Ireland by the King, both as protégé and hostage, 
where he was granted the order of knighthood at the age of twelve. With Henry 
Bolingbroke’s invasion of England
27
, Richard had to leave Ireland behind to defend his 
throne, leaving Henry of Monmouth imprisoned in the castle of Trim as protection. 
The following course of events which culminated with Bolingbroke’s usurpation 
of the throne might have had an effect on the young Lord, who knew Richard better 
than his own father and as such “it must have been with very mixed feelings that Henry 
of Monmouth suddenly found himself heir to the usurper” (Hutchison, 1967:20).   
Nevertheless, he stood beside his father, now King Henry IV, and was entitled “Prince 
of Wales, Duke of Aquitaine, Lancaster and Cornwall, earl of Chester, and heir apparent 
to the throne of England” (Allmand, 1992: 17), shortly after the coronation, forever 
linking the Lancaster’s destiny with the crown of England. Before he turned twelve, 
Henry of Monmouth had already witnessed his mother’s death, his father’s exile, who 
deposed and killed a monarch which had been very close to him. He had also been 
acquainted to the arts of warfare in the Irish marshes and was even imprisoned for a 
brief period.  Without a doubt the events of his childhood took its toll on the now heir to 
the throne, laying the foundations for the hard-resolved and implacable mind of the 
future king, as Hutchison affirmed: “the new Prince of Wales was old beyond his years” 
(Hutchison, 1967: 23). 
Around the turn of the century, in the sequence of the coronation of Henry IV 
and entitlement of Prince of Wales to Henry of Monmouth, a rebellion broke out in 
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Wales, commanded by Owen Glendower
28
, the self-proclaimed prince of Wales 
(Allmand, 1992: 19), who was determined to fight for independence. At first taken by 
the King as a petty revolt of malcontents, soon Prince Henry realized how his father had 
underestimated the strength of the Welsh national spirit, who, by 1402, had a full-scale 
army ready to fight the English. Learning the trade of warfare in the most brutal way 
due to Glendower’s frequent and violent raids, the young Prince soon showed signs of 
the cold-blood and ruthless resolve that would mark his reign, burning villages, killing 
enemies and sustaining his army at his own expenses
29
. However, his first major battle 
was only in 1403, in the sequence of the Percy family’s uprising. The clash took part in 
Shrewsbury and the Prince commanded the left division of the royal army alongside his 
father, who led the right division. With heavy casualties for both sides, the battle was 
invaluable for the sixteen year old Henry of Monmouth to prove himself and his peers 
as a soldier and a leader – shot in the face by an arrow in the beginning of the battle, he 
led his man until the end without tending to his grave injury – feats that made the King 
grant him general oversight of the war against Glendower (Allmand, 1992: 26-27). 
The following years saw a growing surge of Welsh attacks, supported by the 
French crown, with Prince Henry never managing to confront Glendower in pitch battle. 
By 1406, Henry was reappointed Lieutenant of Wales and his army managed to capture 
and kill Glendower’s eldest son. The rest of the Welsh leader’s family was captured and 
brought to London in 1408 and 1409, and the rebellion started to fade out. Although he 
never managed to defeat Glendower (whose death circumstances are still unknown), 
Prince Henry’s experiences in the battlefield against an overpowered and over-
experienced enemy, along with the self-taught art of siegecraft in later battles, marked 
the coming-of-age of a young unproven nobleman, who by the young age of 20 was “a 
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fully qualified general steeled in the hardest of guerrilla fighting” (Hutchison, 1967: 
53). 
Although proved in the arts of warfare, Prince Henry still lacked the political 
experience and diplomatic skills required of a complete leader. The opportunity arose in 
the last six years of Henry IV’s reign, marked by several intermittent illnesses which 
left him incapacitated. Prince Henry seized his place in the King’s Council around 1406, 
and served as head of state for long periods of time during his father’s absence, 
surrounding himself by the Beaufort side of the family (Allmand, 1992: 42). During the 
first years of the Prince’s governing experience, the issues occupying the Council were 
mainly financial affairs and “control of the crown over expenditure” (Allmand, 1992: 
40), which surely gave him the expertise as an excellent administrator, showed during 
his own rule. Meanwhile, he started meddling in French disputes
30
, which derived from 
Charles VI alleged madness, supporting the cause of Burgundy in favour of the 
Armagnac (favoured by Henry IV).  By 1411, King Henry IV recovered from a fit of 
infirmity and promptly ended the prince’s control of the Council, excluding the 
Beaufort and thus creating the attrition with his son that would last until his death
31
. 
Prince Henry’s succession was already at sight by the end of 1412, but it was only on 
March of the following year that King Henry IV succumbed to another bout of illness, 
opening the way for his son’s coronation. 
 
2. Political Context 
Henry of Monmouth was crowned King Henry V on April 9
th
 1413 in the midst 
of a snowstorm, weather which was said to augur a “reign of cold and severity” 
(Ackroyd, 2012: 412). Initially discrediting this presage, his first act as a monarch was 
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to concede an amnesty to a number of heirs of his father’s old enemies, followed by a 
glorious royal funeral of King Richard II who had been secretly buried during Henry 
IV’s reign. Both this acts showed not only a pious and clement side of the new king, 
eager to honourably reconcile with his enemies, but also shrewdness proper of someone 
who was strongly confident in his position as the future bond of a unified nation. As 
Allmand
 
(1992: 61) put it “he was a man who already knew how to lead, who was 
confident in his ability, and was motivated to fulfil what he saw as the main tasks of 
kingship”. 
With the first symbolic gestures resolved and due to the inheritance of a “realm 
that was sufficiently peaceful, loyal and united” (Morgan, 1994: 199), Henry V’s major 
“tasks of kingship” were two: first, the balance of the crown’s exchequer aligned with 
the encouragement of national trade in order to secure England’s wealth (Allmand, 
1992: 61); and second, dealing with the Lollards’ heresy
32
, which was putting the 
country in a religious turmoil. As such, domestic policy in the first couple of years of 
his reign was mainly occupied with these two issues, and the political qualities which 
arose during his brief command of his father’s Council were now completely mature. 
According to Ackroyd
 
(2012: 413) “he proved that, with firm oversight, medieval 
governance was not inherently unstable or incoherent”. Nonetheless, the qualities Henry 
V displayed as a skilled administrator dealing with internal affairs were only shown in 
full with the third “task of kingship”: the preparations for battle arising from the conflict 
with France - which was undoubtedly a situation no new monarch could bypass 
(Allmand, 1992: 62), and the new king saw war as the basis of glory (Ackroyd, 2012: 
413) and, as such, would not miss out on such an opportunity. 
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Before looking at Henry’s casus belli, it is important to understand the reasons 
why the King was interested in quarrelling in France. It is usually argued that the young 
King’s apparent motivation was derived from the will of the English people, who 
expected their suzerain to follow the steps of his ancestors like Edward III, pursuing a 
dubious claim to the French throne. Nevertheless, Allmand (1992: 66) advances with 
two factors which seem more plausible of having influenced his decision: first, Henry’s 
responsibility as duke Aquitaine to preserve his domains; and second, his incessant 
pursuit of justice, in this case taking the shape of the Treaty of Brétigny (Allmand, 
1992: 66) signed in 1360, which had been the core of English demands for decades. 
Moreover, Henry’s security and confidence in his title as well as the conscience that 
rising levels of lawlessness in the realm, caused mainly by idle soldiers which would 
profit from a war scenario, were two additional political reasons he definitely took in 
consideration (Hutchison, 1967: 86-93). Finally, the incessant quarrels between French 
noble families (the previously mentioned Armagnac and Burgundy) and the insanity of 
King Charles VI contributed to a fragile socio-political environment in France, which 
together with the fact that the French had supported Glendower’s revolt in Wales, 
served as excuse for Henry to launch his plans of invasion, constituting the bulk of his 
casus belli. It is surely unfortunate that the legendary act of defiance by the French 
Dauphin and his tennis balls which ultimately led Henry to cross the channel, so 
brilliantly depicted by Shakespeare, apparently has no historical authenticity.  
A long period of diplomatic negotiation followed with both sides presenting 
several offers and counter-offers which were plainly rejected until the spring of 1415 
when King Henry V, exasperated with the failure of the two embassies sent to Paris in 
the last months, decided that he had no other choice than drawing his sword and setting 
sail for France. 
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Despite the lengthy and failed negotiations to avoid war, it is believed that 
Henry’s preparations begun shortly after his coronation (Church, 1889: 59). There is a 
general agreement on the impeccable planning of the war and King Henry’s wide skills 
as administrator – Hutchison (1967: 94) claims he was “one of the most expert 
administrators England has ever had (...) his planning was prodigiously efficient”. In 
regards to diplomacy, soon Henry tried to secure an alliance with John the Fearless duke 
of Burgundy
33
, while managing and succeeding (at least after the Battle of the Seine in 
1416) to destroy French’s maritime assistance, which shows a very unusual knowledge 
of the importance of naval power, proving that he was a ruler ahead of medieval times.  
Internally, he crafted a cash loan and taxation system to finance his enterprise, which he 
managed to explain publicly in order to attract the support of the magnates of the realm 
(Morgan, 1994: 200). Above all, his military and logistics preparations
34
 were 
astonishing, raising a professional army of around 2.500 man-at-arms and 8.000 
archers
35
, followed by a large retinue of supporting staff, where it is important to 
underline the presence of physicians and surgeons, a wholly disregarded issue in 
medieval warfare, showing again his capacity for military command, carefully planning 
to minimize the risk of failure (Church, 1889: 62). 
 
3. Strategic Challenge 
Christopher Allmand (1992: 66) affirms that “the conflict with France provides a 
thread with which to follow Henry’s entire career as king” to which we add that its main 
events allow us to trace the portrait of a man with a mission. From the first day he sat in 
the throne, Henry had its goals clearly laid out in his mind and knew the twofold 
challenge he had to overcome. The first was to achieve unity in a country that, despite 
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peaceful and loyal, had been ruled by devious monarchs for more than 50 years 
(Allmand, 1992: 405) and was ravaged by religious turmoil and financial problems. We 
have already seen that the later issues were dealt with during the first years of reign, 
surely contributing to strengthen the sense of national unity, which was only to be fully 
achieved years later. The second challenge was the urge to deal with the conflict with 
France which had endured for over 60 years, and the restoration of justice regarding 
English demands in the neighbouring country. The conquest may not have been an 
immediate intention, but the fact that it was took on by Henry show not only his great 
ambition, but also the capacity to adapt his aims according to the circumstances. As we 
have partially dealt with the first objective in the previous sub-chapter we will now 
focus on the main episodes of the French conquest and their impact on Henry’s 
leadership.  
Disembarking in France around 14
th
 of August of 1415, Henry’s army marched 
to the fortified city of Harfleur. The choice of Harfleur as the first target was a purely 
strategic move for the city was the most important port of Normandy (Allmand, 1992: 
79), controlling the estuary of the river Seine and thus giving access to both Rouen and 
Paris, allowing Henry to establish a base for future operations. However, the king 
“knew that its capture was unlikely to be a formality” (Allmand, 1992: 79), and indeed 
the siege was a thorny problem due to the bravery of the besieged who managed to 
prolong the clash for five weeks until they were forced to capitulate. This happened on 
the 22nd of September and was a severe blow to the French. Nonetheless, the Siege of 
Harfleur brought also severe consequences for the British as hundreds of men were 
either dead or disabled due to an outbreak of dysentery (Barker, 2006: 152-159).  Apart 
from this, the capture of the city was a major step forward as King Henry managed not 
only to establish an important stronghold in France, but also changed the common 
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policy of war by immediately offering rewards to English merchants and craftsmen to 
become settlers (Hutchison, 1967: 114), instead of allowing the destruction and 
abandonment of a such strategically important point. 
Against the advice of his Council and the will of the army, Henry decided to set 
out for Calais, an English safe haven 120 or 150 miles away from Harfleur. Condemned 
by “every military historian of any consequence since” (Hutchison, 1967: 116), Henry’s 
reckless decision was in fact the result of weighing options. On the one hand, returning 
home with a partly broken army would have easily been understood as a retreat and 
greatly damage his reputation. On the other hand, if he managed to reach Calais we 
would have succeeded in establishing a connexion with the stronghold in Harfleur, 
having also patrolled the territory between this village and Calais. In the case of 
confrontation, he trusted deeply in the protection of God and the memories of his 
English ancestors
36
. He simply chose the “lesser of two evils” (Hutchison, 1967: 117).   
After a generally unmolested half part of the journey, news about the 
approaching French army reached the British while preparing to cross the Somme. 
Forced to make a detour which took its toll in the men and after several days of parallel 
forced march for both armies, the clash was imminent (Allmand, 1992: 86). On the 24
th
 
of October, already with the French army at sight, Henry stationed his troops near the 
village of Agincourt and ordered them to deploy for battle. At this time, Hutchison 
(1967: 120-121) affirms that realizing that he was in a brutally inferior position, largely 
due to the overwhelming French forces, Henry was ready to make terms, releasing the 
prisoners and returning Harfleur to the French with all the damages inflicted repaid if 
granted passage to Calais. Fact or fiction, this episode shows a different side of the 
perfect, heroic and foolhardy leader the legends have immortalized, picturing for a 
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moment a human commander apparently conscious of the lives he had under his 
responsibility.  
In the morning of the 25
th
, the English army stationed between the woods of 
Agincourt and Tramecourt to contain the attack of the French front. The ground was 
rain-soaked from the previous night, creating a muddy stage extremely tricky for hand-
to-hand fighting. It is said that the French outnumbered the British by three or four to 
one
37
 and while the first were divided between cavalry and heavy armed foot-soldiers, 
the later were mainly archers and a core of men-at-arms lightly equipped. Henry’s 
archers planted sharp stakes in the ground in front of their line and prepared for battle. 
After a three hour wait, Henry ordered the bowmen to fire at the French host in order to 
provoke a reaction. Immediately after, the French cavalry charged but crashed against 
the barrier of wooden stakes and the arrows of enemy archers. French foot-soldiers 
advanced but their great number and heavy armours in the treacherous and soaked 
terrain were no match to the light vests and the swiftness of the English, who had 
dropped their bows and started carnage with clubs and daggers. Corpses started piling 
and many fallen Frenchmen died drowned in the mud or under their comrades’ feet.  
Estimates say that French casualties were around 7.000 whilst English comprised only 
500
 
(Hutchison, 1967: 125). The massacre lasted for no more than two or three hours 
(Vincent, 2011: 440), and was far from the battle portrayed by chroniclers and poets
38
. 
Nevertheless, it seemed that Henry V had managed to snatch a victory against all odds. 
The battle was not yet over as movement from French riders was spotted 
heading towards the English rear. Both this happening and the fear from counter-attack 
by the remaining French line prompted the King to order the episode that would stain an 
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otherwise brilliant victory: the killing of all prisoners
39
. Englishmen’s reluctance 
(greatly due to the ransoms they would be losing) forced Henry to name 200 archers to 
conduct the slaughter, which was against all laws of chivalry and medieval warfare, and 
serve only to underline his brutal ruthlessness and twisted sense of honour, which are 
according to Hutchison
 
(1967: 124) “easy to excuse but difficult to admire”. Other 
authors such as Christopher Allmand (1992: 95) have a milder opinion, underlining the 
controversy and uncertainty of the numbers and facts, stating that indeed it was “a tragic 
event whose extent has nonetheless been exaggerated”. 
Putting aside but never disregarding this dreadful event, the overall analysis of 
the upshot of the battle show a hard-fought but brilliant victory. Still regarded as 
“perhaps the most overwhelming victory of won against fearsome odds that [English] 
history as ever known” (Hutchison, 1967: 131), Agincourt is the proof of Henry’s 
strategic genius and military skills. Although a fair share of luck has to be 
acknowledged, the victorious outcome of the battle owes much to the King’s vision, 
carefully planning and the bravery of his men, enough reasons for it to be part of the 
English national myth. But as Ackroyd
 
(2012: 420) put it “no overwhelming victory has 
ever had such tenuous result”, France had not fallen and neither Henry nor his army 
were in conditions to pursue the final goal. Consequently, after reaching Calais the army 
rapidly set forth to England. 
As the immense celebrations for the King’s return emphasized, Henry’s position 
was now greatly strengthened, not only at home but also abroad – “he had become the 
leading figure in the royal politics of Europe” (Ackroyd, 2012: 420), all this in the first 
two years of his reign. 
This reinforced reputation opened several doors for Henry to display his 
diplomatic skills and reveal the real story of his success (Vincent, 2011: 440). In the 
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year following Agincourt, with a strong investment in the royal navy, the English 
managed to defeat the Genoese (allied to the French crown), giving an important step 
towards British naval domination which would mark centuries to come. Later in 1416, 
solely through shrewd diplomacy, he managed to secure the support of the Holy Roman 
Emperor Sigismund, who had come with the mission of bringing France and England to 
terms
40
. The path was now completely clear for his great plans to fully unfold and the 
objective was now clear: Henry V was aiming to sit in the throne of France and 
conquest was the only way to get there. 
“The great invasion of France began on August 1
st
, 1417” (Hutchison, 1967: 
147) with a formidable fleet of 1.500 ships – carrying 10.000 men-at-arms and probably 
three times that number of followers and staff (Hutchison, 1967: 146) – landing in 
Normandy. With Paris in view, Henry launched sequence of sieges starting in Caen 
(where the population was massacred) and slowly advancing until Rouen
41
, whose siege 
lasted from July 1418 to January 1419.  With Normandy virtually conquered and with 
French’s nobility in deep disarray (played off against each other by Henry) the English 
were at the gates of Paris by August. After harsh negotiations through Autumn and 
Winter, the French agreed on the Treaty of Troyes on the 21
st
 May of 1420, which 
stated that Charles VI would disinherit his son while Henry V was recognized heir to 
the French throne and regent of France.  
In the sequence of the treaty he married Charles VI’s daughter, Katharine of 
Valois. These “were the conditions of a man who, through skill and perseverance, and a 
large measure of good luck which he turned to his advantage, had won sufficient 
political power to impose terms both on those who governed from Paris and on the areas 
which they controlled” (Allmand, 1992: 145).  Henry was now “at the height of his 
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power” (Ross, 2014), but not for long. Shortly after his once again magnanimous 
welcome home in 1421, he was obliged to return to France on the account of a number 
of local insurrections and following the successful siege of Meaux, his health rapidly 
deteriorated. After three weeks of pain and lingering in August of 1422, King Henry V 
died at the Château de Vincennes in the last day of the month, at the age of 36. Henry’s 
immediate legacy was doubtlessly formidable. A man who at birth was never meant to 
be king managed to rule and unite England while subduing France, being the first and 
last English king to be welcomed in the gates of Paris as a conqueror. 
 
In the seven years that lasted the campaigns in France, Henry V achieved several 
victories that produced an outstanding effect in the spirits of Englishmen, greatly 
contributing to the union of a nation which had been suffering from weak and devious 
leaderships during the previous generation. Analysing his short-term achievements, we 
can affirm that through the invasion of France he managed to successfully overcome the 
second challenge we outlined in the beginning of the chapter: the restoration of justice 
and the acceptance of English demands in France. He accomplished this mainly through 
his outstanding military skills, which in episodes such as Agincourt revealed that “as a 
leader, as a strategist bent on conquest, as an organizer of military power, Henry was 
highly successful” (Allmand, 1992: 438). We must acknowledge though, that soon after 
Henry’s death his dream of a double monarchy shortly crumbled, revealing how the 
French endeavour, and particularly the settlement accomplished with the Treaty of 
Troyes, might have been, to a certain extent, a grave error of judgement (Allmand, 
1992: 441). Nevertheless, as Allmand
 
(1992: 443) affirms, we should avoid judging 
Henry as a megalomaniac adventurer, for his reasons to invade France were much more 
intricate and very much parallel to Englishmen’s will at the time. 
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Regarding the first goal of national unity, we have already argued how the war 
in France contributed to merge the English people under a common enterprise. The 
administrative skill and the capacity to “rule with direction” (Allmand, 1992: 436), 
underlined in his two initial years as a monarch, contributed immensely to the unity 
effort, allowing him to detach from the rule of both his father and Richard II, thus 
fulfilling the popular hopes for change at the time of his accession. Indeed during his 
life and reign, Henry V displayed several leadership qualities that made him be 
“regarded as a king who had met many of his people’s aspirations and had fulfilled the 
ideals of his office” (Allmand, 1992: 435), which are some of the factors that complete 
our conceptual framework of leadership: influence and accomplishment. Besides those 
two characteristics and to complete our sequence, we can affirm that Henry V provided 
a purpose to his followers through the reawakening of the French conflict and the 
imperative of restoring justice; he always fostered the engagement of the people in the 
military effort (taxation, settlements in France, religious effort) hence providing 
direction and motivation. Finally, his short-term achievements have doubtlessly 
improved the status of England, both internally (financial and social harmony)  and 
externally (foreign reputation). 
All in all, it is just fair to say that King Henry V does not have the epithet 
Erasmus in Anglia
42
 in vain, he was indeed a magnificent leader who marked English 
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 “The Star of England”. 
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Chapter 4 – Shakespeare’s Leaders: Julius Caesar vs. Henry V 
 
«Literature’s freedom to explore endless or exquisite details, portray the 
thoughts of imaginary characters, and dramatize large themes through intricate plots 
brings it closest to the reality of “how the world really works”.» 
Charles Hill 
 
In the previous chapters we have gone through an historical analysis of the lives 
of Julius Caesar and Henry V. In both cases we described their rise to power and the 
main episodes of their political careers, ending with the definition of their individual 
strategic challenge: the Republic-Empire transition for Caesar and the invasion of 
France for Henry. As we have seen, these biographical outlines are fundamental not 
only to trace a portrait of these men leadership style, but also to have a deeper insight on 
how they made their decisions. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that historical 
analysis is (or should be) bound to the imperatives of truth, precision and impartiality, 
hence making the task of probing into the minds of great leaders a very speculative one. 
In the prologue of “Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft and World Order” 
Charles Hill (2011: 24-25) argues that literature is the only discipline that is not 
methodologically constrained, having a much more honest and real take on reality, as 
the quote we began with clearly states. We find Hill’s perspective extremely enticing 
and we feel indeed that between Thucydides and Tolstoy there are several examples of  
literature which are not only a window to the mysteries of the human condition, but also 
a profound reflexion on the mechanisms of politics and society. 
William Shakespeare was perhaps the greatest master in this realm, and his 
importance for our case-study is enhanced for Julius Caesar and Henry V were both 
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subjects in two of his most recognized plays. Our aim in analyzing Shakespeare is to 
emphasize that there are important lessons on leadership and power embedded in his 
work which are timeless and universal. Such lessons can and should be used to 
complement history in order to give us a comprehensive account of leaders’ thinking. 
Therefore, in this chapter we will first analyze Shakespearean portraits of Caesar and 
Henry V in separate, studying its main themes and motifs, and then compare them, 
joining fact and fiction in order to understand the points of contact and divergences 
between both men. 
 
1. Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar 
Along with Romeo and Juliet and Hamlet, Julius Caesar is one of William 
Shakespeare’s most recognizable plays. Although critical opinion was never in 
agreement regarding Julius Caesar quality compared to later tragedies, “the play has a 
clarity of construction and felicity of expression that have made it popular with 
audiences and readers alike” (Shakespeare, 1958b: 333). It was probably written in 1599 
and first performed in September of the same year at the Globe Theatre, according to 
the account of the Swiss traveller Thomas Platter (Shakespeare, 1958b: 333). The play 
is usually mentioned as one of Shakespeare’s tragedies and more specifically as a part 
of the sub-categorization of Roman plays, given to the ones which deal with episodes of 
Roman history. As such, Shakespeare’s main source was Plutarch’s Lives of Noble 
Grecians and Romans (Bloom & Loos, 2008: xi), following closely the biographies of 
Caesar, Brutus and Antony (Dobson & Wells, 2001: 229) with obvious compression of 
time and suppression of events - the play’s time span is roughly one month, while the 
real events, from the Feast of the Lupercal to Brutus and Cassius suicide, span over two 
and a half years (Zander, 2005: 6-7). 
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1.1 The Plot43 
Julius Caesar’s plot revolves around the assassination of Caesar by a group of 
conspirators led by Brutus and Cassius, his long-time companions. The play is divided 
in five acts but we could easily split the action into three parts: the events leading to the 
assassination (the conspiracy), covering the first two acts; the murderer, represented in 
the third act; and the aftermath, spanning the last two acts. 
The play starts with plebeian festivities in tribute of Caesar’s victories over 
Pompey’s sons, and a dialogue between two tribunes, Flavius and Marullus, who 
condemn commoners’ hypocrisy in such celebrations, when soon before they rejoiced at 
Pompey’s achievements. Caesar enters the stage, parading through Rome surrounded by 
his entourage and is advised by a soothsayer to “Beware the ides of March” [1.2.18], 
warning which he soon dismisses. Brutus and Cassius talk alone about the qualities and 
flaws of Caesar, with the latter revealing his fear about Caesar’s alleged wish to become 
king. Meanwhile, Caesar reveals Antony his deep distrust in Cassius. Cassius, in turn, 
keeps devising a scheme to bring Brutus along in a plot to kill Caesar. The second act 
opens with Brutus reflecting upon the pros and cons of Caesar’s assassination and 
deciding that his death is the right thing to do. The conspirators come to his house to 
discuss practicalities of the plan and, after they leave, Brutus’ wife Portia tries 
unsuccessfully to convince him to reveal what is bothering him. At the same time, in 
Caesar’s house, his wife Calpurnia tells him about her nightmares and begs him not to 
leave the house in the morning. Dismissing her request at first, Caesar decides to stay 
after hearing the same advice from the priests. In the end, convinced by Decius, one of 
the conspirators, Caesar heads for the Senate with the rest of the group. Meanwhile, 
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Artemidorus, a roman citizen aware of the conspiracy, awaits near the Capitol to warn 
Caesar. 
On the entourage’s way to the Capitol, they run into both the soothsayer and 
Artemidorus, whose attempts to reveal the plot to Caesar fail. Afterwards, already in the 
Senate, while giving is famous speech claiming he is “as constant as the Northern Star”, 
Caesar is stabbed to death by the conspirators. The commotion is installed, with the 
conspirators seemingly unaware of what to do next. After requesting to meet the 
conspirators, Antony pleads to speak at Caesar’s funeral, being granted that opportunity 
by Brutus against Cassius’ advice. When alone, Antony speaks to Caesar’s dead body 
promising revenge, war and chaos. The next scene takes place in the Forum, where 
Brutus and Antony are to speak to the people on Caesar’s deathbed. Brutus’ speech is 
cold and rational, stating the reasons why Caesar’s death was necessary for the 
preservation of the Republic’s freedom; the commoners rejoice and ironically suggest to 
crown Brutus as Caesar. Antony’s words, on the contrary, are very emotional and 
manipulative, emphasizing Caesar’s deeds and love for the people of Rome. Starting to 
call the conspirators “honourable men” , Antony ends by making accusation of treason 
which set the mob on fire, causing it to leave in order to kill the conspirators and 
unleash destruction. The following assassination of Cinna the poet, taken by one of the 
conspirators, is an example of this. 
The last part of the play (the fourth and fifth act) begins with the encounter of 
Antony, Octavius and Lepidus - the leaders who form the Second Triumvirate - to 
decide whom to kill when they have power over Rome. The next scenes take place in 
Sardis, where Brutus’ army is camped, and involve a harsh discussion between him and 
Cassius, who make mutual accusations putting their loyalty and friendship to test. 
Eventually they reconcile and Brutus reveals that his wife Portia killed herself, news 
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that are further discussed with two soldiers and put Cassius in a state of shock. Later, in 
his tent, Brutus receives the visit of an apparition, allegedly the ghost of Caesar, who 
tells him he will see it again at Philippi.  
The final act opens at Philippi, where the opposing armies stand for battle. The 
rival parties exchange insults and when Antony and Octavius leave, Cassius shows his 
superstitious fears about the outcome of the battle. After Brutus storms to battle, Cassius 
is left with his friend Titinius, whom he sends to the battlefield on account of a charge 
by Antony. Mistakenly informed that Titinius was captured, Cassius, in despair, orders 
his servant to kill him, acknowledging Caesar’s revenge before dying. Later, Titinius 
returns victorious but at the sight of Cassius dead body he also commits suicide. 
Learning of his friends’ deaths, Brutus guides his army to fight once again. 
Nevertheless, after seeing that loss is imminent, he impales himself on his sword, 
claiming that Caesar can now be at rest. The play ends with Antony and Octavius 
arrival and acknowledgment that Brutus was the only conspirator who acted with the 
belief he was doing the best for Rome. As such, Antony names him “the noblest Roman 
of them all” and Octavius promises to bury him with greatest honours before leaving 
both to celebrate victory. 
 
1.2 The Character 
Perhaps one of the most striking and debated feature about Julius Caesar is the 
fact that the character that lends his name to the play - making us assume a priori that 
he is going to be a de facto protagonist - merely appears in three scenes, speaking only 
150 lines (around 5.8 percent of the whole text [Zander, 2005: 6]) and being killed even 
before half of the play has gone through. Furthermore, Peter Alexander has a point 
when claiming that “Shakespeare’s picture of Caesar is certainly difficult to reconcile 
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with the notion that tradition has given us of him” (Shakespeare, 1958b: 333): someone 
who we usually imagine as a great, strong and powerful leader is presented in the play 
as a rather arrogant, self-assured and egotistic individual. But why then did Shakespeare 
draw his portrait in such light? 
The central aspect regarding the character of Julius Caesar in the play is the 
dichotomy and conflict between private and public image (Zander, 2005: 7). In the brief 
moments he makes an appearance we can almost discern two dissociate personalities. 
On the one hand, the moments when he is with his wife Calpurnia both in the streets of 
Rome (1.2.1) and at home (2.1) show a superstitious man, believing in tradition and in 
the omens of augurs. In contrast, Caesar the leader, the public figure, always refers to 
himself in the third person, being greatly confident in his constancy, invulnerability and 
superiority (“I am constant as the Northern Star” [3.1.60] and “Danger knows full 
well/That Caesar is more dangerous than he” [2.2.44–45]). In the end, it was this inner 
conflict and the eventual supremacy of Caesar’s public persona over his private self – he 
neglects Calpurnia’s advice to stay home after knowing that the Senate decided to give 
him the crown – that caused his death. One reading might see this as a proper lesson 
against arrogance, ambition and tyranny, designed to teach that “someone who raises 
himself so far above other human beings and who thinks he does not consist of flesh 
and blood, must immediately afterward realize how much of he himself really does 
consist of flesh and blood” (Zander, 2005: 7-8). 
Nevertheless, the second half of the play shows how such lesson was perhaps 
not the main concern of Shakespeare, who was “not actually concerned with Caesar the 
man, but rather with the nimbus this name has acquired” (Zander, 2005: 8). Against the 
beliefs of the conspirators that Caesar’s death would set things right and restore the 





 or, in other words, Caesar’s reputation and timeless influence, which 
dominates the destinies of every character in the remainder of the play, especially the 
plotters who “feared and hated what he stood for, but failed to understand where is 
strength lay” (Shakespeare, 1958b: 334). Hence, this reasoning makes the choice of the 
title obvious and the debate about protagonists quite pointless, because even assuming 
that Brutus is the tragic hero of the play it is undeniable that “the tragedy of Brutus 
depends totally on Caesar” (Zander, 2005: 8). 
In the end, Shakespeare’s portrait of Caesar may not be, at first, in line with 
what history has accustomed us to, for we see a boastful and pretentious man instead of 
a first-class leader and general. Nonetheless, the comprehensive reading of the play 
clearly shows how this idea is deceitful. The transition from an arrogant Caesar 
believing in his invulnerability but violently reminded of his mortality, to an ethereal 
presence influencing every outcome of the action, ultimately proves Caesar right when 
he claimed “I am constant as the Northern Star/Of whose true-fixed and resting 
quality/There is no fellow in the firmament”. Shakespeare’s supreme irony and his 
untraditional picture of Caesar is merely a device to purport his greatness and 
immeasurable influence, showing that more than a name, “Caesar” effectively 
represents a public institution. 
 
1.3 Caesar and the End of the Republic 
Understanding «theme» as a “unifying idea, image or motif, repeated or 
developed throughout a work” (theme. Dictionary.com, n.d.) it is easy to unveil dozens 
of them in Shakespearean plays such as power, love, treason, revenge and family. In the 
particular case of Julius Caesar, we have already mentioned the dichotomy between 
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public and private self present in Caesar’s character, but many other topics are 
addressed such as the question of fate versus free-will, the power of rhetoric and the 
misreading of signs. But there is another aspect, more deeply connected to the historical 
portrait of Caesar and the strategic challenge we defined previously: the decay of the 
republic and transition to a new political system. 
In his essay «The end of the republic : Titus Andronicus and Julius Caesar», 
Andrew Hadfield
 
(2005: 168) states that “Julius Caesar (…) depicts a dying and 
perverted republican Rome that has lost the ability to inspire its citizens to behave 
virtuously” and thus is unable to function, having necessarily to give way to a new 
system of rule. This is clearly mirrored in the first scene of the first act which joins two 
Roman tribunes and the city’s populace, arguing about the tribute being paid to Caesar’s 
victories. Harold Bloom (Bloom & Loos, 2008: 5) points out the importance of the 
scene for several reasons: first, it reveals the opposition and apprehension to Caesar’s 
rule amidst Roman political elite; second, it introduces the mob, who is apparently 
happy with the current leadership and despite being malleable is doubtlessly a force to 
be reckoned with (as proved later in the play); finally, it shows how the tribunes are 
willing to manipulate the people, which can perhaps be seen as a sign of the corrupted 
political elite. 
Furthermore, the imagery of a decaying Republic intensifies througout the play. 
The lack of a “shared political culture” represented by the stage division of the 
characters into small secretive groups; the rising superstions and  abundance of 
supernatural elements contrasting with the “law and order” of the old Republic; the 
constant clash between classes (Hadfield, 2005: 171); all signs of how the times had 
changed. Even the death of the majority of the characters, most of them symbolic 





what we see is “Rome groping towards a new political structure in an effort 
to accommodate Caesar; the language of monarchy, dimly remembered from the past, is 
the only language they have for this new structure.” 
 
Julius Caesar biographical portraits are hardly consensual, and we have seen that 
his figure attracts admirers and detractors in equal fashion, but in regards to the issue of 
his personal responsibility in the process of suspension of the Republic – which we 
previously identified as part of his strategic challenge – the discussion seems to be even 
more controversial
45
. We briefly analyzed the complexities of the crisis of the Republic 
and Caesar’s role in the second chapter, and apparently Shakespeare seems to agree 
with our conclusions for “the play gives little sense of the republican constitution [and] 
Caesar seems to be not overturning an established order but moving into a political 
vacuum” (Leggatt, 2005: 142). All in all, even though the play is not a tangible portrait 
of leadership such as Henry V, as we are about to see, Shakespeare’s work is a deep 
study of the human condition and an analysis of a period and figure that allows us to 
project how those events might have unfolded in reality. As Jehne (2005: 66) claims 
“this is exactly what makes literature fascinating: it can create connections even where 
the historian has to helplessly face loose ends”. 
 
2. Shakespeare’s Henry V 
Shakespeare’s portrait of Henry V depicted in his second historical tetralogy
46
 – 
Richard II, the two parts of Henry IV and Henry V – is a magnificent character study of 
one of the most charismatic English monarchs, following his life from his reckless 
youth as Prince Hal, to his righteous kingship as King Henry V. The evolution of 
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Henry’s character throughout the plays may not be the most historically accurate, but it 
is through such an astonishing moral transformation that Shakespeare apparently draws 
the consolidation of a true leader. Nevertheless, neither is this dramatic Henry V a 
unanimous character, nor is the play the most consensual, gathering supporters amongst 
patriots and detractors amidst pacifists (Torre, 2004: 13). 
Like Julius Caesar, the play was finished in 1599 and performed for the first 
time in the Globe in the same year (Torre, 2004: 9). We have seen that it is the last play 
of the Henriad, but as the remaining three works it is part of Shakespeare’s English 
Histories, the set of plays concerned with the two major historical episodes in 14th and 
15th century England: the Hundred-Years War and the War of the Roses. His main 
sources were the chronicles of Raphael Holinshed (1577) and Halle (1548), as well as 
the anonymous play The Famous Victories of Henry V
47
. Our analysis will cover three 
main points: first, a brief synopsis of the play; second, a study of the character of Henry 
V, focusing mainly on his leadership; and finally, an overview of other relevant themes 
in the play. 
 
2.1 The Plot48 
Henry V’s narrative follows the story of King Henry V, focusing on the initial 
stage of the invasion of France, namely the events leading to the Battle of Agincourt 
and its aftermath. The play is divided in five acts, each one of them introduced by a 
Chorus who “provides a patriotic voice and an idealistic view of Henry V throughout 
the play” (Bloom & Rolls, 2008: 5) giving it an epic tone (Dobson & Wells, 2001: 198). 
The play opens with a Prologue where the Chorus first engages with the 
audience, apologizing for the inadequacy of the theatre to portray such a story. Act one 
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starts with a laudatory introduction of the King by two clerical figures who are debating 
the passing of a bill unfavourable to the Church, and devising a plan to divert Henry’s 
attention to invade France so he does not pass the law. In a dialogue with the King, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury convinces him that his claim to France is rightful (arguing 
that Salic law – which prevented woman or those whose claim came from the mother 
side, like Henry, to take the French throne – does not apply in France
49
), urging him to 
advance for war. Henry calls in the French Ambassadors sent by the Dauphin, who 
deliver a crate of tennis balls mocking the King’s youth and inexperience. Due to this 
provocation, Henry declares war. 
 Opening the second act, the Chorus makes reference to the eager preparation for 
the French campaign and transports the audience to Southampton, where a plot to kill 
the King is underway by the hands of Scroop, Cambridge and Grey. Before the plot 
scene though, Bardolph, Nym, Pistol and Hostess Quickly
50
 quarrel and afterwards 
mourn Falstaff’s sickness. Returning to Southampton, we know that the King 
discovered the plot and promptly fiddles with the traitors before exposing their plans 
and sentencing them to death. Meanwhile, King Charles and the Dauphin discuss the 
defence of French and Exeter, acting as an English ambassador, comes to present 
Henry’s ultimatum. 
The third act begins with the Chorus describing King Henry setting sail for 
France and starting the siege of Harfleur. It is also revealed that the war started because 
Henry rejected King Charles offer of his daughter Katherine and some worthless 
dukedoms. The first scene comprises King Henry’s inciting speech where we cries 
“Once more unto the breach (…)” [3.1.1]. At the same time, Nym, Bardolph and Pystol 
attemp to desert the battle and are confronted by Fluellen, who is then called by Gower 
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and starts an argument with Macmorris and Captain Jamy. In the end, their truce 
symbolizes the four realm’s
51
 common necessity of fighting France and the union of 
Britain. Harfleur soon surrenders after Henry’s threatening speech. Afterwards, in a 
scene almost totally in French, Katherine is introduced while practicing English. 
Meanwhile, the French noblemen are at shock with Henry’s swiftness and try to plan a 
response. Returning to the English camp, a discussion regarding Bardolph’s looting of a 
Church ends with the King confirming his execution, completely ignoring the fact that 
Bardolph used to be his youth companion. A French ambassador (Montjoy) appears, 
informing that the French army is ready to fight the English unless a ransom covering 
the expenses and humiliation from the invasion is paid to the Crown. Despite 
acknowledging the weakness of his troops, Henry informs them that they will fight and 
defeat the French army. The act ends with a scene depicting the frivolity of the French 
nobles, confident they will crush their enemy. In contrast, the English seem “tired, ill 
and fearful” (Floorman & Kestler, 2015), as noted by the Chorus in the opening of the 
next act. 
Asking his men for some time alone, Henry disguises and wanders his camp, 
mingling with common soldiers. After meeting Pistol, who claims his adoration of 
Henry (but Henry the reckless prince, not the King), Henry engages in a debate with 
three soldiers, representing Englishmen’s worries about the battle to come, who blame 
the King responsible for the souls of the soldiers who will perish in the battle. Henry 
and Williams (one of the soldiers) exchange gloves and promise to fight each other 
when they meet again. Alone, Henry delivers a soliloquy about the burden of kingship, 
briefly revealing his true personality. In a short scene, the French once again brag about 
their undeniable victory. In the English camp, while noblemen are discussing the fact 
that the French vastly outnumber them, King Henry arrives to deliver the famous St. 
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Crispin’s Day speech - an impressive display of exhortative rhetoric, lifting his men’s 
spirits to the fight by promising their deeds will be forever remembered. Again he 
refuses Montjoys’ proposal to pay the ransom. In the aftermath of the battle, the French 
are desperate and lament their army’s disarray. Meanwhile, due to a sounding alarm, 
Henry orders the killing of all the hostages, which fuels a discussion between Fluellen 
and Gowen in the next scene. Montjoy arrives admitting defeat and asking permission 
to collect French corpses. After naming the field of Agincourt, Henry gives the glove to 
Fluellen who afterwards fights with Williams, who is later pardoned and rewarded by 
the King. Hearing the casualty report, Henry attributes the victory to God’s will, calling 
for a procession before sailing back to England. 
The Chorus opens the final act praising the King’s modesty and describing his 
triumphant entrance in London, where he is to negotiate peace with the Holy Roman 
Emperor. The initial scene brings Fluellen and Pistol together in a fight, because the 
latter made fun of a Welsh tradition. At the same time, Henry is negotiating peace with 
Charles and promises the hostilities will end as soon as the French accept his demands. 
Henry then woos Katherine in a clumsy way but she accepts to marry him, given her 
father’s approval. The scene ends with Charles granting the English all that was asked. 
In the epilogue, the Chorus closes the play explaining that Henry VI ruined his father’s 
achievements and Civil War broke out in England. 
 
2.2 The Character 
There is perhaps no other character like Henry V in Shakespeare’s canon. The 
depth with which he explores the transformation of the foolhardy Prince Hal into the 
dignified King Henry V throughout the Henriad, allow us to trace a detailed portrait of 
an acclaimed leader’s emergence. Our focus rests on Henry V, where Shakespeare is 
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apparently celebrating on full-scale the personality of Henry V, in all his facets as 
monarch (Johnston, 2000: 1) – as Peter Alexander (Shakespeare, 1958a: 272) claims: 
“Here at last is the true king, the darling of his countrymen, the example to posterity, the 
man whom the Poet might take as his Hero”. Nevertheless, Shakespeare must always be 
read between the lines because where some view the glorification of a perfect medieval 




A noteworthy aspect of the play is the untainted sequence of spectacular 
successes attained by Henry V, who swiftly and gracefully crosses every obstacle in his 
path. Johnston (2001: 2) even claims that “no other political figure in all of Shakespeare 
is as consistently efficient and successful as Henry”. As such, it is only natural that 
several authors and publications, particularly those related with management leadership, 
use Henry’s example as a primer for leaders, for instance Corrigan (1999), Stevenson 
(1996) and Egan (2000)
53
. Following the leadership framework we devised in the first 
chapter, Henry seems to corroborate every aspect of a modern leader. First, he is a 
major influencer, engaging his fellow noblemen into action by providing “a sense of 
shared agreement, voicing their common feeling” (Johnston, 2001: 5), as the speeches 
to the French Ambassadors [1.2] and the talk about friendship [2.2.76-141/161-188] 
clearly portray. Second, he has a vision for England, and provides purpose and direction 
to his followers through his claim to the French throne, that justifies his major war 
enterprise
54
. Third, his magnificent rhetorical skills (see the famous Agincourt speech 
[4.3.42-69]) are responsible for instilling motivation in his followers, especially in 
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moments when the spirits are low. Fourth, we have already made reference to his 
outright success in every aspect of kingship, and particularly the fact that he managed to 
subdue France is a proof of his capacity to accomplish the mission. Finally, the feeling 
we get is the one of a happy ending, from which England emerges victorious, stronger 
and more united, ascertaining Henry’s role in improving the status of the nation. 
To sum up, the impression we get from a first reading is that Shakespeare is 
indeed giving us the role-model of a modern leader, “the figure of the perfect public 
man” (Ellis-Fermor, 1969: 127). But why? As Johnston asks
 
(2001: 2) what exactly 
makes Henry such a successful leader? 
 
2.3 Success in Leadership 
In her thorough analysis of Henry’s character through the prism of 
transformational leadership theory, Jelena Walker (2009: 3-4) points out the fact that the 
studies that see Henry V as a textbook of leadership fail to understand the complexity of 
both the play and leadership theory. In fact, as we have noted before, this play is subject 
to fierce critical controversy
55
 with one side seeing it as the acclamation of an 
outstanding warrior-king, whilst a second side sees Henry as an aggressive and immoral 
warmonger, dichotomy that should prevent us from making swift judgements.  
Ian Johnston (2001) in his enlightening lecture on the character of Henry V 
clearly notes how, despite achieving successful results in every episode described in the 
play, we never have a clear insight of how the decision-making process developed. 
What is more, except in the scene in the eve of Agincourt where he delivers his famous 
soliloquy [4.1.223-278] he is never alone and we can hardly grasp any hint of his true 
personality. In fact, what we see most of the time is a gifted actor, adopting  “whatever 
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public persona the situation requires”
 
(Johnston, 2001: 3) while imposing his authority 
with such subtlety that everyone feels they took part in the decision that took place. 
Such situation is evident in the second scene of the first act, where Henry clearly “wants 
to be convinced that he has a valid claim to the French throne”
 
(Pittock, 2009: 187) 
although he already sensed his noblemen will to fight and probably took the decision 
beforehand, perhaps even knowing that his claim had no real grounds. Similar situations 
occur first with the Southampton plotters, who are lured to act as their own hangmen, 
and second in Harfleur, where he delivers his bloodcurdling speech pretending he will 
not be able to stop his men’s violence, being perfectly aware of his capacity to impose 
his army an iron discipline. Other intriguing aspect associated to most of these episodes 
is Henry’s “detachment (…) from the emotional content of the role he has to play” 
(Johnston, 2001: 5-6), allowing him to switch roles within the blink of an eye (again see 
the brutality displayed in Harfleur turned into mercy once the goal - the city’s surrender 
- is attained). 
In short, what is unveiled in an attentive reading of the play is the portrait of a 
Machiavellian Henry V. All combined, his capacity to adapt to changing circumstances 
assuming the function any specific situation requires
 
(Johnston, 2001: 4); his ability to 
quickly judge the surrounding environment and adjust his tone, working “on different 
people in different ways” (Leggat, 2005: 127); and his prolific rhetoric and intuitive 
manipulating skills are the secret to his success and to his incomparable political 
effectiveness. Johnston (2001: 8) even argues that Shakespeare is eventually implying 
that political success requires “an effective Machiavel style [that] smothers the 
individual's distinctively human personality under the need for the various public roles 
demanded of the king”. Perhaps we wouldn’t go to such heights, but we certainly agree 
that success in modern politics owes a great deal to versatility, adaptation and public 
61 
 
relations - or Bezio (2013) calls “performative leadership” - as our analysis of Henry’s 
behaviour shows. 
 
Going back to Walker’s thesis, it matters to emphasize her conclusion that King 
Henry V is a “complex character, at certain times exhibiting qualities which can clearly 
be identified with modern transformational leadership principles, at other times 
behaving in a authoritarian self-interested manner” (Walker, 2009: 88), which seems to 
unite two opposing perspectives. In fact, we agree with her conclusions and we also 
believe that the dichotomic views regarding Henry’s character may not be mutually 
exclusive after all. In our reading, Shakespeare’s Henry was in fact a very good leader 
embodying all the qualities we emphasized earlier. Nevertheless, when using his 
character as a leadership primer, one must not fall into the trap of the perfection of “the 
mirror of all Christian kings”, for as we have underlined, Henry’s success owes greatly 
to his knack for “realpolitik”.   
 
3. Caesar vs. Henry V 
“Henry V is a play about a hero; so is Julius Caesar” asserts Alexander Leggatt 
(2005: 141) in the onset of his essay on the politics of Julius Caesar, statement which 
coincides with our analysis in the previous subchapters. We have seen that, although in 
different fashions, Shakespeare focused on the life of these men above all to extol their 
greatness and, to some extent, their heroic qualities. He did it as well to portray the 
political settings behind each of them: Caesar’s Rome, which was synonym of power 
and much praised traditional values such as manhood and honour; and Henry V’s 
England, a strong nation towards unification and at the pinnacle of its warfare success. 
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In the previous sections we have focused on the individual portraits of our case-
studies, both in history and literature, but we are still lacking a comparative analysis. 
Thus, this section will explore the main differences and similarities between Caesar’s 
and Henry V’s leaderships, underlining three core aspects in both and intertwining 
historic and Shakespearean perspectives. 
 
3.1 Differences 
3.1.1 Political status quo – decay vs. unity 
Starting with the conjuncture surrounding both men, we see that the political 
status quo (besides the obvious differences between a Republican system and a 
Monarchy, which is not what we are trying to convey) is quite different in each case, 
almost taking opposite directions, aspect which is clearly portrayed by Shakespeare. On 
the one hand, as we have seen before, in Julius Caesar we are faced with a decaying 
Republic where the once virtuous citizens’ behaviour seems to be corrupted and society 
seems to be looking for a new political solution. On the other hand, Henry V gives us an 
England confident in their ruler, and that despite its internal differences engages in war 
enterprise emerging more united and patriotic as ever. In regards to their leaders, 
“Henry is (…) the centre of a political structure his society takes for granted, one that 
gives him the key role: he is a king. (…) In Julius Caesar we see Rome groping towards 
a new political structure in an effort to accommodate Caesar” (Leggatt, 2005: 141). 
In this case, Shakespeare’s political sceneries run parallel with history. We have 
seen how Meier (1996:1-14/349-363) saw Caesar as an outsider, rising as a by-product 
of a late republic full of contradictions, and how in the end Rome embraced his cause 
choosing Caesar over the republican ideal which, as we emphasized, is conveyed in 
Julius Caesar. Similarly, Henry V’s united England is a faithful portrait of the English 
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spirit during Henry V’s reign. This spirit is described in the third chapter, where we 
analysed how Henry’s campaign in France allowed him to tackle several internal issues 
emerging at the time (Lollardy, weak leadership and financial troubles), doubtlessly 
contributing to the unification of the country under a same banner and thus 
strengthening the power of the monarchy. 
 
3.1.2 Internal enemy vs. external enemy 
Related to the status quo of the political regimes, the issue of the enemy is also a 
point of divergence between the two leaders: whilst Julius Caesar was fighting an 
internal enemy (the dissenting factions in the senate, personified by Pompey), Henry V 
was face-to-face with an external opponent (France). 
 We identified Caesar’s strategic challenge as the tension between his personal 
motivations and the strategy of Rome as a political entity, which came into being as the 
Civil War. This conflict arose simply because Caesar felt that the political system was 
depriving him of his honour and his reputation, thus deciding that the only possible 
solution was going to war, putting his compatriots and former senatorial fellows in the 
opposite side of the barricade.  We see today that Caesar’s fight against the “internal 
enemy” represents the first and crucial step of a clash between a decaying republic and 
the necessity to find a new political system which restored Roman values and order. 
This aspect, as we argued before, is one of the themes explored by Shakespeare in 
Julius Caesar. 
Conversely, we defined Henry’s challenge as the invasion of France and the 
consolidation of England’s unity, which clearly point out to an external enemy. In 
contrast with Caesar, Henry V was the head of a nation which despite some internal 
problems had in its core a strong political office, one in which the people had faith in. 
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Thus, his major concern was to consolidate the unity of his realm and settle once and for 
all England’s old disputes with France. Under those circumstances, as we have seen, a 
war enterprise against the French surfaced as the best solution and ended up being the 
defining aspect of Henry V’s path as king. 
 
3.1.3 Ambition vs. Duty 
Although we have tried to outweigh Caesar’s decision to cross the Rubicon and 
its responsibility in causing the Civil War with the decaying republic and the fact that he 
was a product of that same system, it is impossible to deny the magnitude of the deed 
and the boundless ambition that was behind it. Since its very beginning, Caesar’s 
political career was guided by a lust for power and glory. From his early escalation in 
Roman political ranks to his achievement in Gaul, every step he took seemed to follow 
the rule that “each success made it harder for a man to turn back and the only real safety 
lay in more successes” (Goldsworthy, 2013: 660). Perhaps this was due to the inherent 
violence and fierce competition of Roman politics but, as Goldsworthy (2013: 662) 
claims, “in truth there can rarely have been a sterner or more determined ambition than 
Caesar’s”. This facet is hyperbolized in Shakespeare, where we see a presumptuous 
Caesar, overly confident in his superiority and invulnerability. 
In comparison, Henry V was a man bent on doing what was right, always 
mirroring the sense of duty required of such a monarch. Naturally the political system 
was not at all similar to the Roman times, and he was not forced to fight his way to the 
throne (as to some extent his father did), which could justify a less ambitious 
personality. Nevertheless, his invasion of France could have been the endeavour of a 
man craving for more power and seeking to enlarge his domains for the sake of self 
pride. However, the impression we get is that despite the dubious nature of his claim to 
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the French throne, he set out for war mainly because of a desire for justice and the will 
to do his obligation as king. As Allmand
 
(1992: 443) put it, Henry was “driven less by 
personal ambition than by what he saw as right”. Despite our argument that he was a 
true Machiavellian politician, Shakespeare’s Henry appears to be like this in most of the 
play, a pious and virtuous monarch always trying to carry out royal justice. 
 
3.2 Similarities 
3.2.1 Surprising leaderships 
One aspect which is generally forgotten in the lives of our leaders is the fact that 
neither Julius Caesar nor Henry V were faded, at birth, to achieve the prominence they 
did. 
We have seen that Caesar, though being a genuine Roman aristocrat, was 
member of an old patrician family who had lived better days. In 100 BC, although the 
antiquity and patrician descent of a family were of great importance, the “authority that 
derived from the political and military services it had rendered to the commonwealth” 
(Meier, 1992: 53) (namely the nomination for high offices such has consul) was a major 
source of power and wealth. The Julii had not produced high ranked officials in a long 
time and as such “enjoyed little prominence in public life” (Goldsworthy, 2013: 51) and 
did not possess a considerable fortune. Caesar’s education was not different from any 
other Roman aristocrat and although he was destined to the Senate, the few accounts of 
his childhood and youth did not seem to point out to a career out of the ordinary. 
Likewise, the man who was to be King Henry V was born Henry of Monmouth, 
first cousin once removed of King Richard II and thus not in direct line of succession. 
He was grandson of the powerful John of Gaunt and consequently a member of the 
House of Lancaster, who held a vast fortune and great influence in England, which 
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meant that he probably would have reached prominence amongst English nobility. 
Nevertheless, his destiny changed with his father’s, Henry of Bolingbroke, quarrel with 
King Richard II, which ended in Bolingbroke’s exile and consequent invasion of 
England. The usurpation of the throne turned Bolingbroke into King Henry IV, and 
Henry of Monmouth in his heir, changing his life forever.  
 
3.2.2 Military command 
Perhaps the most striking similarity between the two men is their outstanding 
military skill and the incredible success they achieved in their war enterprises. It is not 
by chance that both strategic challenges we have described previously are deeply 
connected with military matters. 
The apex of Julius Caesar military career is the conquest of Gaul. The Gallic 
War lasted for nine years and what Caesar achieved there was doubtlessly the backbone 
of his future leadership, not only because it granted him the influence and wealth that 
consolidated his power in Rome, but also because it was there that he learned how to 
lead men and think strategically. The swift launch of his campaign against the Helvetii 
that marked the beginning of the war, reveal his amazing vision and sense of 
opportunity, and the majority of battles he fought and the successes he achieved are 
enough proof of his military genius. His aggressive battle style, always taking the 
initiative and remaining close to his men in the line of combat was typically Roman, but 
his leadership skills, motivating his men and giving them direction, combined with his 
fierce drive and belief in success, were what distinguished him from any other great 
Roman general (Goldsworthy, 2013: 458-459). 
Henry V’s military record is equally impressive, starting at a younger age than 
Caesar. At sixteen he was already in command of a large army responsible for breaking 
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the Welsh revolt, which we managed to end by himself before he was twenty one. In his 
first major battle he was shot in the face by an arrow, an injury that did not prevent him 
from leading his troops until victory was secure. Already with a very impressive war 
record behind, his major military achievements came after his coronation with the 
French invasion. An important aspect which cannot be ignored is Henry’s outstanding 
capacity as an administrator, creating a very solid financial and logistic support, to 
which much of his success is owed. Likewise, his victories speak for themselves, being 
crowned by Agincourt, which is the greatest example of his strategic ability and mastery 
of tactics for defeating an enemy which greatly outnumbered him. Moreover, other 
battles show his multiple military qualities, such as the art of siegecraft at Harfleur and 
his investment in the navy (way ahead of its time) which granted the English control of 
the channel and the major line of communication to France. Although not focusing in 
the battle scenes itself, Henry V’s entire dramatic arc is warfare (Floorman & Kestler, 
2015) and the various perspectives it entails. In regards to Henry’s character, we see 
him planning the enterprise, negotiating with ambassadors, being ruthless in Harfleur 
and instigating his men to fight in tough circumstances; different situations which help 
us to spice historical accounts and give life to the monarch. 
 
3.2.3 Twisted Archetypes - Heroes or Villains? 
Finally, a curious aspect that characterizes Caesar and Henry V is their striking 
connexion with the literary concept of hero. On the one hand, both of them seem to 
largely fit the profile of the heroic figure of their times, respectively the Classical and 
the Medieval. On the other hand, for particular reasons, each of the archetypes they 
represent seems to be twisted, aspect which Shakespeare skilfully depicted (especially 
in regards to Henry V). 
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One of the themes explored in Julius Caesar is the struggle between the two 
forces underlying human existence: fate and free-will, struggle voiced by Brutus in the 
second scene of the fourth act: 
 
There is a tide in the affairs of men. / Which, taken at the flood, leads on to 
fortune; / Omitted, all the voyage of their life / Is bound in shallows and in 
miseries. / On such a full sea are we now afloat, / And we must take the current 
when it serves, / Or lose our ventures [4.2.268-274]. 
 
This dilemma is at the centre of the Classical hero myth, who is also bound to 
“perform extraordinary feats” and die “in an unusual way” (Norman, 2003). The reason 
why Caesar is such a remarkable character is because he was capable of subverting and 
controlling not only his own destiny but the destiny of a nation, shifting the course of 
history by crossing the Rubicon on the basis of his free-will. Thus, we can say that his 
persona embodies a twisted archetype of the tragic hero, for despite conjuring a set of 
virtues (and some inevitable flaws) to perform enormous deeds that liberated him from 
the laws of fate, Caesar acted only for his own sake and honour rather than the greater 
good of mankind. Some call him an ambitious and amoral dictator, others a military and 
political genius who saw the end of the Republic before it happened and did what he 
could to ensure the future of the Rome. Regardless of the perspective one has, the truth 
is that throughout his life, taking the current when it served, Caesar proved that men are 
not predestined to succeed or fail, but rather by ambition, honour and commitment 
achieve greatness. 
In regards to Henry V, we have already made reference to Shakespeare’s 
depiction of him as a seemingly perfect medieval knight in the subchapter on Henry V. 
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Vera Norman underlines the main characteristics of this archetype as being war 
experience as a proof of manhood, good moral character, obedience to hierarchy, sense 
of chivalry and honourable principles; all aspects which fit the profile of Henry. 
Nevertheless, we have seen how this reading of the King’s character is incomplete, for 
the play conveys a Machiavellian side of Henry which is ultimately the reason of his 
success, subverting the idea of a pristine medieval paladin. His piety and moral 
standards are also subject to questioning, and in the end we seem to be left with a 
completely blurred notion of good and evil in politics. But perhaps, this was exactly 
Shakespeare’s aim because, as Johnston (2001: 13) suggests: “in a world ruled by an 
absence of trust and the importance of power, the system requires someone extremely 
skilled in manipulating others into some form of cooperative endeavour, even if that 
involves a war with little justification”. 
 
With this chapter we tried to offer a summary of how Shakespeare portrayed 
Julius Cesar and Henry V. With Julius Caesar, tough not offering  a portrait of a leader, 
Shakespeare gives us an account of the last days of a dying political system with an 
outstanding man, feared by ones and loved by others, directly in its core. Whether we 
read it as a lesson on the consequences of tyranny and ambition or a tribute to man with 
an influence that goes beyond the grave, Julius Caesar is a timeless play dwelling with 
crucial issues for any leader as we will discuss in our last chapter. Much more clearly 
than in the first, Henry V presents a true character study and a detailed picture of 
leadership. Here the obvious theme is kingship and, as such, what we see is a heroic 
monarch performing every role his office demands and excelling at it: he is impartial, 
righteous, strong, patriot, determined and inspirational. However, as we argued, 
Shakespeare’s subtlety suggests how these roles may simply be a necessity of politics, 
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showing how an ability to act according to the needs of the circumstances might dictate 
success. 
In the second part, we put both men side by side and tried to see where their 
portraits converged or deviated. Joining history and literature we emphasized how 
different were the political conjunctures they lived in, how they were fighting different 
kinds of enemy and how one’s drive differed from the other’s. Nevertheless, we also 
saw how unexpected their leadership was, how outstanding military skill united them in 
achieving their goals and how their characters represent subverted portraits of heroic 
figures. However, after knowing these men both in history and fiction one last question 



















«Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.» 
King Henry IV in Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part II 
III.1.31 
 
Throughout this dissertation we have attempted to draw a portrait of two leaders 
through the prisms of history and literature, trying to unveil if there were lessons we 
could extract from their examples. More than their historical prominence, our choice of 
Julius Caesar and Henry V was due to their connection with Shakespeare, who wrote 
two plays around them. Our aim with the analysis of the two Shakespearean characters 
side by side was to see to what extent can literature help us complement historical 
sources in order to have a better understanding of what is leadership. 
In the first chapter - «What is Leadership» - we defined the three core concepts 
in our analysis: leadership, strategy and grand strategy. Although this chapter was, 
above all, a theoretical exercise, we emphasized the importance of these notions to 
analyse the path of the leaders we chose. Furthermore, the chosen definition of 
leadership allowed us to establish a framework constituted by six aspects we consider 
crucial for a successful leadership: influence, purpose, direction, motivation, 
accomplishment and improvement. This structure, aligned with the notions of strategy 
and grand strategy, was implicit throughout our analysis, namely in the definition of 
Caesar and Henry’s strategic challenge and in the final remarks of each portrait, where 
it was analysed if they fit the leadership profile. 
The second and third chapters of this dissertation - «Julius Caesar» and «Henry 
V» - covered extensive portraits of our case studies through an historic and biographical 
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analysis. In both we followed the same structure starting with their upbringing and 
family context, moving on to the most remarkable events in their career and finalizing 
with the analysis of their strategic challenge and its consequences. The introduction of 
the notion of strategic challenge as the main test our leaders had to overcome during 
their rule, allowed us to put their leadership in perspective and see how they reacted to 
particular circumstances. On the one hand, we saw how Caesar’s quest for honour was 
the trigger for the Civil War, which ended 450 years of Republican Rule and was the 
first step towards an Empire which would last until 1453 AD
56
. On the other hand, 
Henry V’s military campaign in France led to several astounding victories which 
culminated with the French capitulation making him (even if only briefly) regent of the 
neighbouring country and quasi-head of a dual-monarchy. Besides, we also confirmed 
how their leadership profiles fit the framework established in the first chapter. 
Finally, the fourth chapter – «Shakespeare’s Leaders – Caesar vs. Henry V» – is 
the central section of our study for it covers our analysis of Shakespeare’s depiction of 
the two leaders. The chapter consists of two parts: the first covering each of the plays 
separately and the second analysing the characters side by side. In the first part, our 
intention with the inclusion of a plot summary of both plays was to introduce the main 
episodes covered by Shakespeare, giving a flavour of the characters involved and the 
overall ambience, in order to facilitate the comprehension of the following examination. 
In our analysis of Julius Caesar we presented the debate regarding Caesar’s status as 
protagonist, which we demystified by showing how the dichotomy between public and 
private image, as well as the transition from arrogant mortal to ever-present spirit, 
served as a device to purport the immortality of the leader as a public institution. 
Furthermore, we also debated how Shakespeare provides an outstanding account of the 
political environment during Caesar’s time, namely with the imagery of the decaying 
                         
56
 The date of the fall of Bizantyum and the Eastern Roman Empire. 
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republic, showing how Caesar was seemingly moving into a political vacuum instead of 
toppling a functional political system. In regards to Henry V we have tried to convey 
how Shakespeare attempts to transmit a two-sided portrait of leadership, emphasizing 
how the process of leading is not linear. On the one hand, we have a portrait of a 
glorious hero and the cast of a modern leader: inspiring commander, major influencer, 
great motivator, skilled politician and brilliant general. On the other hand, Shakespeare 
transmits the idea that Henry might be above all a true Machiavellian leader, showing 
an outstanding capacity of adaptation and a range intuitive manipulating skills that are 
responsible for his magnificent political effectiveness. In the second part, Caesar and 
Henry are put to comparison and their differences and similarities analysed. In the first 
case, we have underlined how political conjuncture, nature of the enemy and type of 
drive were the core points of divergence between them. In the second case, it was 
emphasized that unexpected leadership, military command and the fact that they both 
represent twisted heroic archetypes were the main points of convergence and, to some 
extent, central aspects to their success. 
 
Our historical and literary analysis of the lives of Julius Caesar and Henry V was 
guided by the purposes of finding lessons for present leaders in the examples of these 
two men and understanding the relevance of Shakespeare to the field of leadership 
studies. Reflecting upon the work we conducted in the previous chapter led us to reach 
two sets of conclusions, parallel with the two aims we pointed out: the first regarding 
successful leadership profiles and the second regarding leadership in literary 
perspective. 
The first set of conclusions derives from the framework of leadership we 
deduced from the concepts outlined in the first chapter. The study of both Caesar and 
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Henry V’s biographies in the second and third chapters allowed us to describe the 
episodes in the lives of the two men which corroborated the six characteristics we had 
emphasized before as central aspects for a successful leadership. Our belief is that this 
framework of leadership - influence, purpose, direction, motivation, accomplishment 
and improvement - proved to be timeless due to the fact that we can easily apply it to 
the analysis of historical leaders and find common ground between two men who ruled 
separated by a time spam of almost 1500 years. Moreover, from both the examples of 
Caesar an Henry V we have seen how specific skills and traces of character are 
invaluable for the construction of a successful leadership like military proficiency (“war 
is the crucible of leadership” [Newell, 2009: 18]), outstanding vision (a “focus on acting 
beyond the demands of the present” [Murray, 2011: 2]) and a capacity to adapt to 
changing circumstances (“when faced with a new situation, each could draw from past 
experience and come up with the right answer” [Strauss, 2012: 31]).  
In addition, it was also seen how these historical portraits are extremely prolific 
in examples of how strategy can be applied to several fields, from the battlefield to the 
senate, passing through family and even love affairs. In most of the crucial episodes in 
their lives these two men exhibited a capacity of thinking strategically which usually 
tilted the odds to their favour and allowed them to achieve the victories which today are 
found in history books. Certainly they were not morality paragons, since both of them 
have more than one situation which left their hands stained with blood, acting at times 
with an indiscriminate mixture of clemency and brutality, as Caesar’s massacre in 
Gaul/clemency policy in the Civil War and Henry V’s killing of prisoners in 
Agincourt/piety in Harfleur. Nevertheless, also from these episodes we can take lessons 
on the hardships of power, the tough decision-making processes every leader inevitably 
faces and the necessity to be ruthless when the situation requires. Ultimately, the 
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analysis of these characters actions and all the moral ambiguities that come along with 
them is where the value for present and future leaders resides. We have argued on the 
difficulty of building a leadership framework from our examples due to the socio-
political differences between their time and ours (namely, the authoritarian political 
system), but instead we have shown that these historical portraits hold key insights on 
the practical aspects of leadership, which only corroborates Churchill’s words: “ Study 
history, study history. In history lies all secrets of statecraft”.  
The second set of conclusions deals with the Shakespeare’s relevance to the 
study of leadership. One of the reasons that led us to choose this dissertation topic was 
the belief that literature brings added value to the study of leadership, idea which is 
transmitted by Nicholas Warner (2007: 1) who argues that “the capacity of the arts 
vividly to portray the personal dynamics of leadership can make artistic analysis a 
valuable complement to more empirically-oriented research (…) precisely because such 
areas of creative endeavour as fiction, theatre, and film focus on the nuances of human 
interaction”. We have seen throughout our analysis that it is complicated to argue that 
Shakespeare’s work should serve as a blueprint for current and future leaders, for there 
is no possible comparison between our times and the social, political, economical and 
military realities of both Caesar and Henry V. It is also true that, most of the time, 
Shakespeare seems not to be concerned with portraying the decision processes of 
leaders. Nevertheless, what we want to convey is that his insights on the way these men 
thought and acted, as well as his exploration of the complex human dilemmas that arise 
from leadership positions, are invaluable to build on our framework of what it means to 
be a leader.  
On the one hand, in regards to Henry V, Shakespeare underlines the qualities 
and virtues of the leader-monarch, apparently portraying the archetype of a true 
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medieval hero: brave, loyal, upright and just. On the other hand, a second and more 
attentive reading of the same play casts a shadow on the character (uncovering multiple 
facets proper of a Machiavellian politician) and raising, as it was argued, dilemmas on 
the burden of power and the reasons for success in politics - judgement and versatility. 
Furthermore, his depiction of Julius Caesar, which despite any discussion about being 
the main character is without doubt the core and raison d’être of the play, is far from 
flattering and it revolves around the inner struggles between private and public image 
and the capacity (or lack of it) to adapt to changing times - the death of the republic. 
The themes and motifs Shakespeare develops could not be more relevant to a study of 
strategic leadership. We would risk affirming that there is hardly a more accurate and 
thorough portrayal of the challenges of leadership, whether the leader is a Roman 
consul, a medieval King of England or a twenty-first century politician. 
 
A doubt that accompanied us throughout the development of this dissertation 
was the lack of a theoretical structure to back our analysis of the leaderships of Julius 
Caesar and Henry V. A possibility would have been to look at our case-studies, for 
instance, through the prism of transformational leadership emphasizing the analysis of 
the leader-follower relations, and it would probably have yielded more straightforward 
results than those we achieved. In fact, one of our sources had such an approach with 
Henry V and it was partly due to the interesting conclusions and final argument that 
“Shakespeare's own standpoint is essentially neutral and closer to real life, in which it is 
highly unlikely to find a leader who could be considered completely transformational” 
(Walker, 2009: 89), that we decided to undertake a more generalist approach, 
intertwining literature with history. Naturally, our conclusions have a more descriptive 
rather than prescriptive stance, and leave several open doors for further analysis. But 
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this is a reflexion of the ambiguous nature of leadership and the fact that it still is, as the 
quotation from John MacGregor Burns we used in our first chapter states, “one of the 
most observed and least understood phenomena on earth”. 
Perhaps one path to a further understanding of the leadership phenomenon is to 
open this field of studies to areas with different perspectives like literature, fostering its 
link to leadership research, in order to give it a more human touch. Leadership is, above 
all else, a very complex human behaviour and like Burns (Bailey and Axelrod, 2001: 
116) we believe that its causality is still the “most crucial question”. Shakespeare 
brilliantly captured its intricate nature in the line with which we opened this chapter: 
“Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown”, idea which is emphasized by the examples 
of Julius Caesar and Henry V, and certainly will not cease to be a faithful representation 
of every leader to come. As such, this is something we must always keep in mind when 
striving to find new approaches to leadership studies, so our leaders of tomorrow have a 
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